Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings by Gellhorn, Ernest
MUltt taw 3fou-nat
VOLUME 1971 NUMBER I
RULES OF EVIDENCE AND OFFICIAL NOTICE
IN FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGSt
ERNEST GELLHORN*
Twenty years have pissed since Kenneth Culp Davis reviewed how
agency ingenuity reconciled fairness with efficiency in developing
flexible rules of evidence for administrative hearings,I and thirty years
have transpired since Walter Gellhorn proposed the concept of official
notice to expand upon the judicial practice and make use of
administrative knowledge and experience.2 In the meantime agencies
have multiplied as the role of government expands into almost every
segment of the economy and life in general. Benefits once considered
privileges to be, dispensed or withdrawn at an administrator's
unreviewable whim are now matters of right deserving procedural
protection. 3 A record of experience under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 4 the statute which governs most federal agency
adjuducations and provides a practical model for state hearings, now
fills the open contours of that act. Continuous review of federal
administrative procedures and recommendations for improvement are
now institutionalized through the permanent Administrative
t Copyright © Ernest Gellhorn.
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A. 1956, LL.B. 1962, University of
Minnesota. The assistance of Paul Gottlieb, a second year law student at the Duke Law School,
and of Roger Kimmel, a third year law student at the Virginia Law School, is gratefully
acknowledged. A more basic treatment of the rules of evidence in administrative hearings will
appear in a chapter entitled Administrative Evidence in E. CLEARY et al., HORNBOOK ON
EVIDENCE to be published in 1971.
1. Davis, Evidence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34 MINN. L. REv.
581 (1950); see Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REv. 364 (1942).
2. W. Gelihorn, Official Notice in Administrative Adjudication, 20 TEXAS L. REv. 131
(1941).
3. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise
of the Right-Privilege Distfnction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (Supp. V, 1970).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Conference. s While this brief discussion obviously does not exhaust
the list of significant changes affecting administrative procedures
since the forties and fifties, it establishes my basic point: it is time to
restate and review the rules of evidence applied in administrative
adjudications, and, where appropriate, to reconsider their validity.
This article seeks to accomplish these immodest goals in terms
understandable to the beginning student yet challenging to the expert
teacher, practitioner, and administrator. Some compromises are
inevitable. "
AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION7
Most administrative enforcement has relied upon informal
methods including advisory letters, administrative warnings, or
settlement stipulations. Like their judicial counterparts, however,
agencies have also relied upon trial-type proceedings for deciding
disputed questions of fact and for ordering compliance with specific
laws and regulations.
Although the assembly of comparative figures is still inexact, the
conclusion is indisputable that administrative trials far exceed the
number of judicial trials. For example, in fiscal 1963 -the most recent
figures available 8-almost 70,000 administrative trials involving oral
testimony and verbatim transcripts were heard by the more than 100
agencies of the federal government. 9 In comparison the federal district
5. Id. §§ 571-76;see 1969 ANN. REP. ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES (1970).
6. The next section, for example, need not detain those familiar with administrative
hearings.
7. See generally I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW chs. 1-3 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as COOPER]; 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. I (Supp. 1965) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS].
8. Reliable data on administrative adjudications are still unavailable despite repeated
recommendations that agencies collect usable statistics. See. e.g., Recommendation Nos. 1. 17 &
27, FINAL REPORT ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-62, reprinted in part in
SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-62, S. Doc. No. 24,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1963); Recommendation No. 14, 1969 ANN. REP. ADMIN. CONF. OF
THE UNITED STATES 43-44 (1970). Consequently, so-called problem areas are identified only
because of individual grievances, the volume or importance of the complainant, or because,
when the failure is egregious, a systematic failure of an agency to perform its assigned task
generates substantial public dissatisfaction. In other words, despite the general sophistication of
administrative procedure, the basic tools for measuring the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of
such techniques are still undeveloped. Cf. Posner, A Statistical Study of Anti-trust
Enforcement, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 365 (1970). Yet one should acknowledge, of course, that
quantitative statistics are not the only tool for measuring agency performance.
9. These figures consist of the following agency hearings reported in SUBCOMM. ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH
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courts heard fewer than 11,000 civil and criminal cases that year, and
not even 6,000 of these were jury trials.10 As these figures suggest, the
importance of jury trial rules of evidence has been overemphasized in
the law schools and the literature. Indeed, the subject matter and
significance of administrative hearings equal those facing the courts.
Their range extends from relatively insubstantial workmen's
compensation claims to precedent setting antitrust merger rulings
involving millions of dollars and affecting thousands of employees.
At first glance many, and perhaps most, administrative
adjudications appear to be merely carbon copies of judicial trials.
Usually open to the public, the majority are conducted in an orderly
and dignified manner, although not necessarily with the formality of a
judicial trial. Typically, the proceeding is initiated by the agency's
filing of a complaint in a manner similar to the procedures followed in
a civil action. Following the respondent's answer, discovery and
prehearing conferences may be held. At the prehearing conference,
presided over by a trial examiner who conducts the hearing and rules
on all motions, the agency is represented by counsel who presents
evidence in either written or oral question-and-answer form in support
of the complaint. The respondent then presents his case in the same
fashion. Witnesses may be cross-examined, objections may be raised,
and rulings issued. The parties usually submit briefs and proposed
findings to the examiner and may also make oral argument. Shortly
after the hearing is closed, the examiner renders a decision, usually
supported by findings, and written opinion. If neither agency counsel
nor respondent objects, the recommended order is customarily
CONG., 2D SESS., STATISTICAL DATA RELATED TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 82 (Comm.
Print 1964) (Part II of the "Statistical Greenbook"):
-Closed by agency decision on merits after hearing
and preliminary decision .............................................. 17,573
-Closed by agency final decision on merits without
preliminary decision .................................................. 17,195
-- Closed by prelim. decis. on merits which
became final without review by agency ................................... 16,310
- Other final disposition .............................................. 11,488
TOTAL 69,566
Professor Davis has inflated this total to 81,469 by including as complete agency hearings cases
in two additional categories: (1) "withdrawal, consent, settlement, or other agreement without
final decision on merits"; and (2) "dismissed on procedural grounds without consent of the
parties." See I DAVIS § 1.02 (Supp. 1965).
10. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts




adopted by the agency; if there are exceptions, the agency will hear the
matter in the manner of an appellate court through the submission of
briefs and oral argument by both parties. In general, therefore, a
lawyer experienced in litigating cases in state or federal courts will not
find an administrative hearing strange or unfamiliar. The parties are
represented by counsel; the examiner is treated with deference; and the
evidence is received in the usual question and answer form.
This does not mean that variations from this general pattern are
either uncommon or insignificant. Many adjudicatory hearings are
conducted informally, without the presence of attorneys, by hearing
officers without legal training. In some cases actions may be initiated
by a private party rather than by the agency, as in a case involving the
grant of a license or the approval of a rate rather than a finding of
compliance or violation of a statute or regulation. These differences
often affect the manner and kind of evidence which will be received. II
Another and more significant distinction between judicial and
administrative adjudications, however, is that agency hearings tend to
produce evidence of general conditions as distinguished from facts
relating solely to the respondent. This difference can be traced back to
one of the original justifications for administrative agencies, namely
the development of policy. Administrative agencies more consciously
formulate policy by adjudicating-as well as by rulemaking-than do
courts. Consequently, administrative hearings require that the hearing
officer consider the impact of his decision upon the public interest as
well as upon the particular respondent. Testimonial evidence and
11. See R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 174-75
(1942) [hereinafter cited as BENJAMIN] (footnotes omitted):
The law of evidence as it now exists, however useful it may be in practical operation in
the courts, is unsystematized, difficult to understand in detail, and difficult to apply. Its
successful application requires trained and experienced judges . . . . Its successful
application requires also trained and experienced counsel. The law of evidence as applied
in judicial proceedings is not self-executing ....
It is a frequent characteristic of [state] quasi-judicial proceedings that the hearing
officer is not a trained lawyer; nor would more legal training of hearing officers assure
expertness in the field of evidence. It is another frequent characteristic of quasi-judicial
proceedings that the parties are not represented by counsel. The essential conditions of
the successful application of the rules of evidence are therefore lacking, in many in-
stances. For those instances at least, administrative adjudication must be able (as in my
judgment it is) to operate satisfactorily without a legal requirement that the exclusionary
rules of evidence be applied.
Since the time of the "Benjamin Report" many states have improved the status and stature of
their hearing examiners. See 1 COOPER 331-38; W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
885 n.4 (5th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE].
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cross-examination therefore play less important roles in many
administrative hearings.12
A closer examination of administrative adjudication discloses
significant institutional distinctions between agencies and courts.
These distinctions alter, for application in administrative hearings,
the rules of evidence applied in jury trials presided over by a judge.
Foremost among them is the fact that an administrative hearing is
tried to the trial examiner and never to a jury. Since many of the rules
governing the admission of proof in judicial trials are designed to
protect the jury from unreliable and possibly confusing evidence, 13 the
rules need not be applied with the same vigor in proceedings solely
before a judge or trial examiner. 4 The trial examiner decides both the
facts and the law to be applied. Usually a lawyer, he is often an expert
on the very question he must decide. Consequently, the technical
common law rules barring the admissibility of evidence have generally
been abandoned by administrative agencies.
Courts accept whatever cases the parties present; their familiarity
with the subject matter is accidental. Agencies, on the other hand,
usually select their cases; trial examiners and agency chiefs are either
experts or have at least a substantial familiarity with the subject
matter since their jurisdictions tend to be restricted. In addition, an
agency usually is staffed by experts whose reports, commonly relating
to matters adjudicated before the agency, are made available to
examiners and commissioners alike. While this development of
agency experience and expertise is commonly offered as a
justification for administrative agencies, 15 it also creates a basic
12. For some penetrating insights on whether such evidence should be dispensed with in
deciding questions of "policy," see Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another
Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L.
Rav. 485, 521-22 (1970).
13. [The law of evidence is] a piece of illogical, but by no means irrational, patchwork;
not at all to be admired, nor easily to be found intelligible, except as a product of the jury
system. . . where ordinary untrained citizens are acting as judges of fact. J. THAYER, A
PREUMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 509 (1898).
14. Most commentators agree, for example, that the hearsay and best evidence rules are
products of the jury system, see.2 DAVIS § 14.03 (1958) (collecting authorities), and that neither
rule is applied with the same strictness in cases tried to the judge and not the jury. C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 137 (1954).
15. The significance of such experience and expertness has also been questioned. See, e.g.,
W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 28 (1941); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 25 (1965); Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition




conflict between assuring fairness to the respondent on the one hand
and promoting efficient use of reliable information on the other. The
respondent, for example, wants an opportunity to rebut or explain all
the "evidence" which the examiner or agency relies upon in making
its decision. Yet the agency wishes to avoid the burden of having.to
prove once again previously established "facts." As a result the
agencies developed the doctrine of "official notice" in administrative
hearings, a concept which expands on the concept of judicial notice',
long applied in judicial proceedings. Briefly, this concept requires that
an agency give the respondent prior notice and an opportunity to
rebut any material facts which the agency would otherwise presume to
exist. 17
Pressure to abandon, or at least to limit, the application of
technical common law rules of evidence has been directed toward
administrative agencies from many quarters. In some cases the
legislative direction is clear. One major reason for the creation of
workmen's compensation commissions was to avoid the costly and
often impossible burden of the hearsay rule. Others, especially the
licensing bureaus and claims agencies, were created to provide speedy,
cheap, and efficient justice. Their cases seldom involve issues of
credibility and demeanor evidence" 8-the cornerstone of the hearsay
rule. The question-answer format and strict rules of admissibility have
little application to judgments involved in granting airline route
applications or setting utility rates.' 9 Consequently, many agencies
have formulated procedures for receiving opinion and written evidence
with only limited opportunity for cross-examination. This is not to
say that administrative agencies have undertaken a general departure
from the basic principles of evidence. Rather it is in agency hearings
that many of the hard questions of evidence are probed.
THE LAW GOVERNING ADMINISTRATIVE EVIDENCE
The legal framework governing the conduct of administrative
adjudications is not complex and can probably be best understood by
first examining the law which determines the kind of proof an agency
can receive into evidence.
16. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, ch. 37.
17. For the APA's treatment of the doctrine of official notice, see APA § 7(d), 5
U.S.C. § 556(e) (Supp. V, 1970).
18. See W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE 711-12.
19. See Robinson, supra note 12, at 519-24.
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Federal Law. Until the passage of the Administrative Procedure
Act in 1946,20 the receipt of evidence into federal administrative
proceedings was limited only by general constitutional requirements
of fairness and privilege together with the vague directions implicit in
the standard for judicial review developed by appellate courts or'
written into agency enabling acts. 2' The requirement of fairness
generally means only that the respondent
shall have an opportunity to be heard and cross examine the witnesses against
him and shall have time and opportunity at a convenient place, after the
evidence against him is produced and known to him, to produce evidence and
witnesses to refute the charges. .... .
The test for judicial review typically provides that "[tihe finding of
the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive."3 Either standard could be read as a command
that administrative agencies must rely upon common law rules of
evidence barring hearsay and other secondary evidence, since the
respondent could neither confront nor cross-examine such evidence or
since the evidence was not competent and therefore not substantial.
Neither the agencies nor the courts have accepted these contentions.24
The exclusionary rules of evidence were originally designed to assure
that evidence admitted would be relevant and reliable. But the
opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination is not the sole
measure of reliability. As early as the turn of the century, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the Interstate Commerce Commission-the
first regulatory agency to conduct formal adjudicatory hearings-was
not bound by the exclusionary rules:
The [ICC's] inquiry should not be too narrowly constrained by technical rules
as to the admissibility of proof. Its function is largely one of investigation and
it should not be hampered in making inquiry pertaining to interstate commerce
by those narrow rules which prevail in trials at common law. .... 2
20. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105,
3344, 5362, 751 (Supp. V, 1970).
21. Only a few special statutes articulate procedures for individual agency hearings. See,
e.g., Federal Aviation Act §§ 1001, 1004, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1481, 1484 (1964); Federal
Communications Act § 409,47 U.S.C. § 409 (1964).
22. NLRB v. Prettyman, 117 F.2d 786, 790 (6th Cir. 1941). See also Morgan v. United
States, 304 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1938); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 705, 708 (5th Cir. 1964).
23. Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70
HARv. L. REv 827, 904-05 (1957) (a distillation of the most typical provisions of the statutes
providing for judicial review).
24. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 245-48 (1959).
25. ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. -5,44 (1904). In response to a challenge to an ICC order based
partly on hearsay, the Court observed that "[e]ven in a court of law, if evidence of this kind is
Vol. 1971:1]
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Occasionally federal authority has held that the mere admission of
legally incompetent evidence is reversible error. But such decisions are
exceptional and erroneous unless other grounds can be established for
rejecting such evidence. 2 Thus, by 1941 the Supreme Court could
confidently note that "it has long been settled that the technical rules
for the exclusion of evidence applicable in jury trials do not apply to
proceedings before federal administrative agencies in the absence of a
statutory requirement that such rules are to be observed."7
With the adoption of the APA, Congress codified this case law by
providing that "[a]ny oral or documentary evidence may be received"
in an administrative hearing.28 Specific statutes may, however,
override the application of the APA to agency hearings. In a few
instances Congress has either exempted an agency's hearings from the
APA or has specified that other procedures shall govern certain
administrative hearings.2 Sometimes the congressional objective is
not clear. For example, the Taft-Hartley Act amended the National
Labor Relations Act to provide that the Board's adjudications "shall,
so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of
evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under
the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of the United States
... 9" Although it seems doubtful that this amendment had the
intention of imposing jury trial rules on NLRB hearings, at least one
court has held that "hearsay evidence must [now] be excluded from
consideration by the Board and by [the reviewing court]." 31
Fortunately, however, most reviewing courts have taken the sensible
admitted without objection, it is to be considered, and accorded its natural probative effect
.... .Spiller v. Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry., 253 U.S. 117, 130 (1920).
26. Compare Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1938), with FTC
v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948). In response to the Tri-State ruling that the
admission of all hearsay is improper since it deprives the respondent of its right to cross-
examine, Dean Wigmore commented acidly: "No wonder the administrative agencies chafe
under such unpractical control." I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 34 (3d ed. 1940).
27. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, Dep't of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 155 (1941).
28. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
29. See S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 216 (1946); cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1964),
applied in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
30. Labor-Management Relations Act § 10(b), 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1964). Section 10(b) of the 1935 Act, which Taft-Hartley modified, provided that "rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling." National Labor
Relations Act § 10(b), 49 Stat. 453 (1935).
31. NLRB v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 202 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1953); accord, I
COOPER 384. But see NLRB v. International Union of Oper. Engr's, Local 12, 413 F.2d 705,
707 (9th Cir. 1969).
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stand that the mere admission of hearsay is not within the purview of
the Taft-Hartley amendment.3 2 Despite this almost universal judicial
interpretation, NLRB examiners invariably apply the strictest
common law rules of evidence and refuse to admit hearsay testimony
unless it is within one of the recognized exceptions.3 3 Several
explanations can be offered: (1) hearsay evidence is generally
unreliable in labor cases which commonly involve hotly-contested
questions of credibility and demeanor evidence is best tested under the
common law rules; (2) following the common law rules is the path of
least resistance, and a trial examiner who rejects hearsay evidence
need not fear Board reversal; or (3) most examiners "grew up" on the
common law rules and have been unable to shed comfortable habits.
None seems particularly convincing. Whatever the reason, the point
worth noting is that the reality of agency hearing practice does not
always reflect the rhetoric of judicial supervision. In Labor Board
hearings the difference is regrettable. It seems ripe for investigation by
the Administrative Conference.
Of more concern is a recent decision which holds that the general
provisions of an agency's enabling act override the APA's hearing
provisions. In Cohen v. Peralesu the Fifth Circuit ruled that since the
Social Security Act permits the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare to adopt rules of evidence, procedures established under this
power are not subject to the restrictions of the APA. The impact of
32. E.g., NLRB v. Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers Local 419, 213 F.2d 49, 53
(10th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Philadelphia Iron Works, Inc., 211 F.2d 937, 942-43 (3d Cir. 1954).
33. This conclusion is supported by comments from NLRB hearing examiners, staff
attorneys, and labor practitioners to the author. See also Archer, Query: Should Administrative
Agencies Tailor Exclusionary Evidence Rules Specifically for Their Own Proceedings? An
Illustrative Study of the NLRB, 3 IND. LEG. F. 339 (1970).
34. 412 F.2d 44, rehearing denied, 416 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. granted sub nom.
Richardson v. Perales, 397 U.S. 1035 (1970), noted 1970 DUKE L.J. 146. The statutory
provisions which, when implemented, were held to override the APA provided:
(a) The Secretary shall have full power and authority to. . . adopt reasonable and
proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the
proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same [to receive
benefits].
(b) . . . Evidence may be received at any hearing before the Secretary even though
inadmissible under rules of evidence applicable to court procedure.
(g) . . . The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .42 U.S.C. §§ 405(a), (b), (g) (1964).
The Secretary's hearing regulations did not in fact alter the APA standards. The regulations
required that "[the hearing examiner. . . shall receive in evidence. . . any documents which
are relevant and material to such matters" and that "[e]vidence may be received at the hearing
even though inadmissible under rules of evidence applicable to 'court procedure." 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.927-.928 (1970). Seealso 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
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this particular ruling-that hearsay evidence was admissible -seems
of minimal consequence since a similar result would have been
appropriate under the APA.35 Nevertheless, it is disturbing that the
court disregarded prior cases which assumed that the APA hearing
provisions applied to social security adjudications, 36 ignored direct
rulings by other courts that similar Food and Drug Act provisions
should be read in pari materia with the APA provisions, 37 and seemed
oblivious to the absence of any indication that this interpretation of ,
the Social Security Act would in any way serve a congressional
purpose. If upheld by the Supreme Court, Perales may encourage
other agencies to follow the NLRB's return to unnecessarily strict
rules of evidence in administrative, hearings.38 An alternative and
preferred interpretation of the Social Security Act would allow the
Secretary to promulgate rules and procedures consistent with the
APA. Whether the Perales decision is a harbinger of similar rulings
that the APA does not govern hearing procedures in other
agencies-a distinct possibility since the language relied upon in this
instance by the court is common to that in other agency enabling
acts39-should be settled during the current term of the Supreme
35. E.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Gardner, 417 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 938 (1970); see S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, 271 (1946).
36. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1964); Vanderpool v.
Celebrezze, 240 F. Supp. 801 (D. Ore. 1965); cf. Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d I (2d Cir.
1966); Couch v. Udall,.265 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Okla. 1967), affd, 404 F.2d 97 (l0th Cir. 1968).
37. E.g., Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1949).
38. See Project, FederalAdministrative Law Developments-1969, 1970 DuKe L.J. 67, 151-
52:
Such a construction erodes the authority of the APA and will allow divergent
procedures to be established for each agency, contrary to congressional intent that there
be uniformity of procedures among the agencies. If Social Security hearings are not to be
subject to the restrictions of the APA, the large body of case law developed by other
agencies under the APA will not be applicable, with a resulting loss in judicial efficiency
and increase in the uncertainty of individual litigation. The court's statement may also
have the deleterious effect of providing precedent for eliminating the APA's coverage of
all hearings provided for by statute. . . . [A]pplication of the Social Security Act rather
than the APA could create differences. For example, the Secretary could modify the
Social Security procedures so that a person could not be represented by counsel...
while the APA provides a statutory right of counsel to parties. Even greater differences
would result if the exemption is applied to the entire APA, not merely the hearing provi-
sions. This may have the effect of lessening the reviewability of Social Security determi-
nations and narrowing the scope of review for those subject to judicial scrutiny. Id.
39. See, e.g., Railway Labor Act § 3(u), 45 U.S.C. § 153(u) (1965) ("The Adjustment
Board shall. . . adopt such rules as it deems necessary in carrying on its proceedings"); Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825g(b) (1965) ("All hearings, investigations, and proceedings under
this chapter shall be governed by rules of practice and procedure to be adopted by the




State Law. The constitutional limitations applied to federal
agencies also impose restraints upon state hearings. The states in turn
have freed their administrative agencies from the "rules of evidence,"
but not always for the same reasons. Most state agencies were created
as political-administrative bodies rather than as quasi-judicial
commissions.
Fifty years ago, the typical state agencies would include, perhaps, rural
township supervisors who as members of local boards of assessors would
estimate the value of their neighbors' farms, and statehouse politicians who as
a railroad commission would bargain with railroad attorneys concerning the
granting of franchises and the fixing of rates, and insurance commissioners
who would watch with a wary eye the premiums charged by fire insurance
companies . . . and-in the more progressive states--"committees of
arbitration" who would informally arbitrate compensation claims of workers
injured in industrial accidents under the newfangled workmen's compensation
laws."'
Neither these state agencies nor the parties appearing before them
could have followed judicial rules of evidence. As the agencies became
more sophisticated, and their hearings more formal, the presentation
of evidence was formalized. Now, as with federal agencies, their
hearings are often indistinguishable from nonjury civil trials.
Nevertheless, the original approach that state agencies are not
restricted by common law rules in the admission of evidence has
continued .4  One leading observer has contended that this liberal
approach has outrun its reasons.42 Attributing its continuance to
legislative lethargy, to arbitrary agency desire to operate with a free
hand, and to the judicial trend toward relaxation of exclusionary rules
*The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, ruling that written reports of examining
physicians may constitute substantial evidence, and that, since the evidentiary standard relied
upon by the Secretary did not deviate from the APA, the Court did not have to decide which
prevailed. Richardson v. Perales, 39 U.S.L.W. 4497 (U.S. May 3, 1971).
40. 1 COOPER 379 (footnotes omitted).
41. Many state statutes explicitly provide that the common law rules of evidence applicable
to jury trials shall not govern agency hearings. E.g., ANN. CALIF. LABOR CODE § 5709 (West
1955); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 11(2) (1966). Several practical reasons have been offered
for not following rigid common law rules of evidence in state hearings: agency hearings are often
held at one or a few central locations distant from the scene of events, making it difficult for
eyewitness participants to testify; hearings may be held shortly after the complaint is filed,
making the advance preparation and the marshalling of the best witnesses and documentary
evidence difficult; and the heavy case-load volume, much of which is routine and involves only
matters of small consequence, renders formal requirements of proof inappropriate. See
BENJAMIN 175-76.
42. 1 COOPER 380-81.
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in court cases, he decries this laxity concerning the application of the
common law rules and suggests that state agencies should be
"'required to follow the rules of evidence to about the same extent and
in about the same way as judges do when trying cases without
juries.1'' 4 His argument fails to recognize, however, that this standard
is meaningless, since no such rules exist. As Dean Wigmore noted over
a generation ago: "On this question, there is a singular dearth of
authority."44 Nor has the gap been filled in the intervening years."
The Revised Model State Act furthers this erroneous suggestion by
proposing that the rules of evidence applicable in nonjury civil cases
should be followed in state agency adjudication. 46 Happily, with the
exception of six states which have adopted this provision,4" state
legislators have ignored this advice.
Thus, the trend in state agencies, both by statute and court rule,
continues to be away from-rather than toward-the technical rules
of admissibility.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
As I have already indicated, administrative agencies generally are
not restricted in the kind of evidence they can admit. The mere
admission of proof that would be excluded as irrelevant, immaterial,
incompetent, or redundant under the rules of evidence adopted in a
jury trial will not restrict enforcement of an agency's decision. The
43. Id.
44. 1 J. WIoMoRut, supra note 26, at 171; see id. 201.
45. 2 DAVIs § 14.04 (1958).
46. Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act §10(1) (1961), criticized in K,
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 584 (1965).
47. The three state statutes following the 1961 Revised Model Act are: GA. CODE
ANN. § 3A-101 el seq. (1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-35-I et seq. (1969); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 29A-1-I et seq. (1969). Three other states have similar provisions: CoLo. REv. STAT,
ANN. § 3-16-4(7) (1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(175) (1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-
32-06 (1969). While continuing this meaningless suggestion, the 1970 version of the state APA
makes the helpful addition that "[w]hen necessary to ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible
of proof under those rules, evidence not admissible thereunder may be admitted (except where
precluded by statute) if it is the type commonly relied upon by prudent men in the conduct of
their affairs." Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 10(1) (1970). See also note
75 infra and accompanying text.
48. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, Dep't. of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 155 (1941).
On the other hand, several states have followed the lead of the Revised Model Act that
"[i]rrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded." ALAS.
STAT. § 44.62.460(d) (1967); ANN. CALIF. GOV'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1967); GA. CODE
ANN. § 3A I16(a) (1969); Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.070(8) (1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-
35-10(a) (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-2(a) (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.10(1)
(1967). There is, however, a paucity of case authority interpreting and applying these statutes,
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APA confirms this practice in section 7(c) by providing that "[a]ny
oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a
matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.""0 Note, the APA opens
the door to any evidence which the examiner admits and- only suggests
that insignificant and redundant evidence should be rejected, giving
the agencies broad discretion. Moreover, the APA pointedly omits
hearsay or other "incompetent" evidence from the list of evidence
which should not be received.-" Thus the exclusion of otherwise legally
inadmissible evidence from an administrative hearing may be error. 5'
Furthermore, it is clear that the exclusion of relevant, material, and
competent evidence by a trial examiner will be grounds for reversal if
that refusal is prejudicial. 52
The courts have pressed the agencies to abide by the spirit of these
rules. The leading example of such pressure is found in Samuel H.
Moss, Inc. v. FTC,5 3 where a distinguished panel of the Second
Circuit admonished a hearing examiner for rigidly following the rules
of evidence:
although courts have occasionally expressed their disapproval of the admission of such evidence.
See Bunting Bristol Transfer, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 418 Pa. 286, 292, 210
A.2d 281, 284 (1965); D.F. Bast, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 397 Pa. 246,251, 154
A.2d 505, 508 (1959). Several state courts have been criticial of agency receipt of hearsay
evidence, essentially on grounds that the particular evidence lacked probative force. See, e.g.,
Gomez v. Industrial Comm'n, 72 Ariz. 265, 233 P.2d 827 (1951); Zawisza v. Quality Name
Plate, Inc., 149 Conn. 115, 176 A.2d 578 (1961). But only occasional-and usually
earlier-state decisions have reversed agency rulings merely on the grounds of the receipt of
hearsay evidence. See, e.g., In re Trustees of Village of Westminister, 108 Vt. 352, 187 A. 519
(1936).
49. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970). Not only the Act's words but also the legislative
history make clear that the exclusionary rules do not govern the admissibility of evidence in
administrative hearings and that the provision for exclusion applies only to "irrelevant,
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence" and not to legally incompetent evidence. United
States ex rel. Dong Wing Ott v. Shaughnessy, 116 F. Supp. 745, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), affd on
other grounds, 220 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955); see 2 DAvIs § 14.05
(1958).
50. See the authorities cited in note 49 supra. In this context, the definition of hearsay is
second-hand information which would not come within any of the exceptions to the "hearsay
rule."
51. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 26 Ad. L.2d 216 (E.D.
Ill. 1969); 2 DAvis § 14.09 (1958).
52. NLRB v. Burns, 207 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1953); Prince v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Ariz.
314, 361 P.2d 929 (1961); People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Board of Supervisors, 251 N.Y. 156, 167
N.E. 204 (1929); see I CooPER 367-71 (collecting authorities). But see notes 32-33 supra and
accompanying text.
53. 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.) (per curiam decision by Clark, A. Hand & L. Hand, J.J.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
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[l]f the case was to be tried with strictness, the examiner was right. . . .Why
either he or the [Federal Trade] Commission's attorney should have thought it
desirable to be so formal about the admission of evidence, we cannot
understand. Even in criminal trials to a jury it is better, nine times out often, to
admit, than to exclude, evidence and in such proceedings as these the only
conceivable interest that can suffer by admitting any evidence is the time lost,
which is seldom as much as that inevitably lost by idle bickering about
irrelevancy or incompetence. In the case at bar it chances that no injustice was
done, but we take this occasion to point out the danger always involved in
conducting such a proceeding in such a spirit, and the absence of any advantage
in depriving either the Commission or ourselves of all evidence which can
conceivably throw any light upon the controversy.5
Many reasons support the admission of hearsay and other legally
incompetent evidence in administrative hearings. 5 Foremost among
them is the fact that these exclusionary rules do not determine the
probative value of the proffered evidence. Professor Davis, the leading
proponent that hearing officers should make no distinction between
hearsay and non-hearsay evidence, makes the point this way:
[T]he reliability of hearsay ranges from the least to the most reliable. The
reliability of non-hearsay also ranges from the least to the most reliable.
Therefore the guide should be a judgment about the reliability of a particular
evidence in a particular record in particular circumstances, not the technical
hearsay rule with all its complex exceptions.'
To require that a trial examiner refuse to admit hearsay makes no
sense where there is no jury to protect and the trier of fact is equally
exposed to the evidence whether he admits or excludes it. 7 Admission
without a ruling-as long as the evidence has some element of
reliability - does no harm and can prove more efficient than the
requiring of a ruling which may later be held erroneous. Discarding
54. Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
55. See Patterson, Hearsay and the Substantial Evidence Rule in the Federal Administrative
Process, 13 MERCER L. REV. 294, 304-06 (1962); cf. Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179
F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950); Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1366
(1970).
56. Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 689 (1964). One
commentator has asserted that nine-tenths of the problems involved in applying the exclusionary
rules in administrative hearings-or, at least, those problems that come to reviewing
courts-involve hearsay. Note, Exclusionary Rules of Evidence in Nonjury Proceedings, 46 ILL.
L. REV. 915, 919 n.23 (1952). While this unsubstantiated statement probably overstates the
problem, a quick perusal of the advance sheets supports the conclusion that many of the
administrative evidence questions raised in courts of review do indeed involve hearsay.
57. Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 1942). But cf. Note,




the exclusionary rules eliminates the need for the parties to interpose
protective objections-the objections being preserved by their briefs
to the examiner or agency-and relieves the examiner of making
difficult rulings before all the evidence is available. It assures a
complete, yet not necessarily unduly long, record and might well
avoid the need to reopen the hearing. Hearsay, of course, is not
subject to current, in-court cross-examination, but that limitation
affects the weight such evidence carries, not its admissibility.58
The fact that administrative hearings need not follow the
exclusionary rules and the fact that the admission of remote or
repetitious evidence is not reversible error do not suggest that
"'anything goes" or that all proffered evidence, whatever its relevance
or trustworthiness, should be admitted. Wholesale admission would
only add to delay and further expand records which often are already
too long.-9 Nor can an efficient adjudicatory system decide anew each
time the question is presented whether some particular type of
evidence should be admitted. Such procedures would not only be time
consuming but also unsatisfactory to the parties involved and would
provide no basis for preparing for the hearing. Regrettably, most
agencies have not fully developed regulations governing the extent to
which the exclusionary rules should not be applied. 60 In general, the
admissibility of evidence in administrative hearings depends upon the
importance of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issues rather
than to the legal standards of relevance and materiality. The basic
point made earlier should not be ignored-namely, that
administrative hearings generally follow the time-tested judicial
pattern of receiving evidence.6
However, several significant and useful deviations from the
judicial pattern appear in administrative hearings. The first, of course,
involves the relatively free receipt of hearsay evidence which appears
reliable. Equally important is the manner in which oral testimony is
58. See Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719, 724 (Ct. Cl. 1969); W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE
713-14,772.
59. See, e.g., National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 321 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1963). For a graphic
portrait of the endless transcript of one Federal Power Commission gas case, see W. GELLHORN
& C. BYSE 940.
60. 2 DAVIS § 14.07 (1958).
61. Cf. W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 75-82 (1941). It is also
clear that agencies have not adequately explored methods to streamline the process of obtaining
reliable evidence. See SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 1961-62, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1963).
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received. Witnesses in agency hearings are frequently permitted to
testify in a simple, natural, and direct fashion, without unnecessary
interruptions from either the attorney who is directing the questioning
or his adversary.62 Only when the witness strays far afield or the
question is remote will an objection be sustained. A third departure
permitted from judicial practice occurs when the examiner is
uncertain whether to exclude the evidence on the grounds of
incompetency, irrelevancy, or immateriality. In administrative
hearings the tendency is to admit the evidence since the need for a
complete record and the desirability of avoiding reversal outweigh the
disadvantages of a slightly longer record and the delay involved in
receiving the evidence. Other techniques, principally the use of written
presentations and shortened hearings-are discussed below.63
Since administrative hearings differ so widely in scope and
significance, it is impossible to suggest a single standard to govern the
admission of all evidence. It is probably still true, however, as one
keen observer noted almost thirty years ago, that the more closely
administrative proceedings approach judicial proceedings in formality
and in the nature of the issues to be tried, the greater the degree to
which the exclusionary rules will be applied.Y Nor has improvement
been made to the standard suggested by the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure in 1941: "The ultimate test
of admissibility must be whether the proffered evidence is reliable,
probative and relevant. The question in each case must be whether the
probability of error justifies the burden of stricter methods of
proof." 5
In observing agency hearings, it is depressing to note that the rules
of evidence supposedly governing agency hearings are honored in the
breach more often than in practice. If this meant that examiners were
developing new and flexible responses to an ever-increasing and more
complex caseload, I would only be concerned with recording these
developments and sharing their wisdom. My observations, however,
are rather that the strictest judicial rules are frequently applied in
62. See W. Gellhorn & Lauer, Administration of the New York Workmen's Compensation
Law II, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 204, 209 (1962). For a discussion of the use of narrative testimony in
jury trials, see 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 766-88 (3d ed. 1940).
63. See notes 163-84 infra and accompanying text.
64. BENJAMIN 178; see Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARv. L. REV. 364, 386-90 (1942).
65. FINAL REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S.
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1941).
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agency hearings, even though no jury is present and demeanor
evidence is not in issue.6" Several parties share the blame. Trial
examiners are too timid, preferring the safety of ancient rules to the
efficiency of modern practice. Agencies have abdicated their
responsibilities by failing to supervise trial procedures, 7 by writing
rules which do little more than sluggishly repeat the APA's broad
authority,68 and by acting only when the cries of protest can no longer
be safely ignored-and even then the response is limited to the
necessary minimum to satisfy particular demands.69 Courts and
agencies have been intimidated by the length of hearing records. The
judiciary is also aware of the broad legislative mandate given most
agencies to solve the delegated problem in any reasonable manner and
that agencies therefore need considerable freedom of action. Nor have
counsel participating in administrative hearings contributed to
improvement; naturally enough they have concentrated on substantive
results rather than procedural niceties. While these observations do
not necessarily imply that agencies should grant more interlocutory
appeals on evidentiary objections, they do suggest that the occasional
hortatory passages in agency opinions which affirm initial decisions
have not had the desired impact. If the agencies believe that liberalized
rules of evidence should apply, as I do, then they must develop
pressures which assure that these rules are observed. What is needed
first, perhaps, is a series of in-depth studies to test this thesis. The
Administrative Conference would seem ideally suited for this task. If
my observations, are correct, that body should develop and
authoritatively recommend effective institutional responses.
THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
In contrast to the effect of a trial court's decision to receive
hearsay evidence in a jury trial, a hearing officer's decision to receive
such evidence in an administrative adjudication is only the first step in
66. Professor Posner's observation that FTC hearing examiners hew to traditional rules of
evidence largely disregarded in almost identical federal antitrust trials, Posner, The Federal
Trade Commission. 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 52-53 & n.23 (1969), need not be confined to that
agency.
67. Initial decisions by hearing officers are seldom reversed because of overly restrictive
evidentiary rulings. Nor have agencies provided much direction to their examiners.
68. See Davis, supra note 56, at 695.
69. Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 TRADE REG. REp. 19,373 (FTC 1970); Campbell
Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,261 (FTC 1970); Campbell
Soup Co., id. 19,006 (FTC 1969).
Vol. 1971:1]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
determining its impact upon the tribunal's decision. The admission of
evidence in a jury trial is often considered the last effective legal
control because of the assumption that the jury will rely upon or be
swayed by such evidence regardless of whether or not its reliability has
been established. In an administrative hearing, on the other hand, as
in the case of nonjury trials, it is assumed that the trial examiner will
not rely upon untrustworthy evidence in reaching his decision. Thus if
there is "competent" or trustworthy evidence to support the decision,
the reviewing court presumes that the examiner or trial judge relied on
that evidence-and not the "tainted" hearsay-in reaching his
decision. 70
Nevertheless, the more difficult-and often crucial-question for
the hearing officer is the determination of whether he should rely upon
hearsay evidence in reaching his decision. The examiner's concern is
with the reliability or probative worth of the evidence. 71 Jury trial
rules of evidence exclude hearsay on the theory that more often than
not it may prove untrustworthy. 72 The party against whom the
evidence is admitted can neither confront nor cross-examine its
original proponent to test its probative worth. But on the other side of
the ledger is the fact that each of us constantly relies upon hearsay
evidence in making important decisions. Without hearsay, commerce
would stop, government would cease to function, and education would
be reduced to each teacher's personal experience (and even the latter
would often be based on hearsay). It is not surprising, then, that no
legal system outside the Anglo-American realm has adopted so
restrictive a rule of evidence. Scholars have consistently rejected its
across-the-board application and the courts are increasingly rejecting
its application, even in jury cases.73
On the other hand, the fact that some hearsay may prove reliable
is no guarantee that all hearsay is reliable. Nor is it responsive to
observe that the rules of evidence already admit much that is
worthless. Why, it could be asked, should more that is worthless be
admitted in order to find some that is trustworthy, particularly when
there is no assurance that the factfinder will rely on the latter and
70. See generally, Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal?, 79
HARv. L. REv. 407 (1965).
71. The same weighing process is often involved in the examiner's decision whether to
receive the evidence. If it is unlikely to be probative, he will not receive it regardless of the
inapplicability of the hearsay rule.
72. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 224.
73. See, e.g., Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331 (1961).
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disregard the former? It could also be contended that unless probative
evidence could be distilled or some alternative protection devised, the
admission of hearsay would not promote justice. The administrative
regulations governing the receipt and evaluation of evidence indicate
that the agencies themselves have not adequately wrestled with this
issue.7 The courts have indirectly provided only scant guidance in
upholding administrative reliance on some hearsay evidence. Judge
Learned Hand has offered the classic formulation:
[The examiner] did indeed admit much that would have been excluded at
common law, but the act specifically so provides . . . [N]o doubt, that does
not mean mere rumor will serve to "support" a finding, but hearsay may do
so, at least if more is not conveniently available, and if in the end the finding is
supported by the kind of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed
to rely in serious affairs.'-
Hearing officers and agencies have adhered to this common sense
standard instinctively.76 At the same time, several criteria applied in
evaluating the reliability of hearsay can be discerned. 77 The following
are the most significant:
(a) What is the "nature" of the hearsay evidence? If the hearsay
is likely to be reliable, it usually becomes an exception to the hearsay
rule. Moreover, if the evidence is intrinsically trustworthy, agencies
have taken the next logical step and relied, if necessary, upon this
evidence in deciding cases, even though it technically constitutes
hearsay and does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions. One
example of intrinsically reliable hearsay, intra- and inter-corporate
documents not shown to be within the business records exception, was
the subject of a celebrated opinion by Judge Wyzanski in a nonjury
74. See 2 DAVIS § 14.07 (1958).
75. NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 567
(1938), rev'd on other grounds, 110 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1940) (emphasis added). See also
International Ass'n v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 29,35 (D.C. Cir.), affd, 311 U.S. 72 (1939); John Bene
& Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 299 F. 468,471 (2d Cir. 1924). Several states-both by judicial decree and
by statute-have adopted this test to permit agency departures from the exclusionary rules
where compliance is impracticable and where the evidence is "of a type commonly relied upon
by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." See, e.g., Ring v. Smith, 5 Cal. App.
3d 197, 204, 85 Cal. Rptr. 227, 232 (1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-1 16(a) (1969); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 3.560(175) (1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-06 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-10
(1969); W. VA. CODE § 29A-5-2(a) (1964).
76. Sigmon, Rules of Evidence Before the 1.C.C., 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 258 (1962); Note,
Evidence Problems in NLRB Hearings and the Applicability of the Proposed Code of Evidence,
55 HARv. L. REV. 820, 827-33 (1942).
77. 2 DAVIS § 14.10, at 296-303 (1958).
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trial not dissimilar to an administrative hearing. 78 An even clearer
example of hearsay satisfying the reliability criteria is newspaper
reports. 79 Stories of significant news events are likely to be reliable,
and newspapers normally do not report accidents which did not occur.
On the other hand, newspaper summaries of public comments are
commonly inaccurate-at least if one may believe those who claim to
be misquoted -because of the difficulty of hearing and then
summarizing another's views. Even so-called verbatim transcripts
commonly suffer from significant errors as a result of the pressure of
time deadlines. Note that the hearsay quality of each report is
identical. Yet the accident report will be treated as solid support for
an administrative decision and the speech summary, unless
corroborated, will not."
(b) Is better evidence available? The necessary substantiation for
the reliability of hearsay evidence may arise from the failure of
respondent to controvert the hearsay when the proof is readily
available to him, even though there is no testimonial or documentary
evidence of such available "support." The leading example of this
position is United States ex reL Vajtauer v. Commissioner,"' where
the Supreme Court upheld a deportation order based on a finding that
the alien had advocated the overthrow of the government by force.
The alien gave his name as Emanuel Vajtauer, a "Doctor of
Psychology" and editor of the "Spravedlvost." In making his finding
the director relied upon two items of hearsay: a pamphlet bearing the
name of Dr. E.M. Vajtauer as author; and a newspaper report of a
speech by a Dr. Vajtauer, editor of the "Spravedlvost," supporting
revolution. Both items became convincing evidence when "the
appellant, confronted by this record, stood mute. . . . His silence
without explanation other than that he would not testify until the
entire evidence was presented, was in itself evidence that he was the
author. ' 8 2 Workmen's compensation cases furnish a further
illustration. In one typical case, the testimony revealed that the
78. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 355-56 (D. Mass. 1950),
noted in 60 YALE L.J. 363 (1951).
79. See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. Rav. 364, 390 (1942); cf. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d
388 (5th Cir. 1961).
80. See United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); Montana
Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491,498 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 47 (1951).
81. 273 U.S. 103 (1927).
82. Id. at 111. But cf Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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workman went home, told his wife that he had been injured while at
work, repeated the same story to a doctor, and died. No one saw the
accident; no better evidence was available. Placing special reliance on
the statute's remedial purpose, the agency relied upon this hearsay
evidence even though it fell outside the spontaneous exclamation
exception.Y On the other hand, if credible first-hand witnesses had
told another story-for example, that the accident happened
elsewhere-the hearing officer would likely have rejected the hearsay
testimony, especially if the witnesses' testimony was corroborated by
convincing circumstantial evidence.Y
(c) How important is the subject matter in relation to the cost of
acquiring "better" evidence? Many examples are available. If the
out-of-hearing declarant is readily available and the question involves
the respondent's livelihood or security-as is often the case in loyalty
and deportation matters-hearsay by itself carries little weight. If,
however, the matter is but one of thousands of compensation
claims-as in social security and workmen's compensation
cases-and the declarant's appearance Would be relatively costly or
time-consuming, hearsay alternatives such as letters or other written
evidence might prove decisive.8 It has likewise been held that, in the
granting of a license, an agency may rely upon evidence which would
not be adequate in revoking the same license. 7
(d) How precise does the agency's factfinding need to be? The
ICC's reliance on "typical evidence" and the FTC's use of survey
83. Greenfarb v. Arre, 62 N.J. Super. 420, 163 A.2d 173 (1960); see John W. McGrath
Corp. v. Hughes, 264 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1959); Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v.
Cardillo, 106 F.2d 327, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1939); cf. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publ. Co.,
207 F. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913) (quoting trial court court opinion by L. Hand, J.). See generally 3
A. LARSON, TnE LAW OF WORKrEN'S COMPENSATION § 79 (1952); 2 id. (Supp. 1970).
84. Jacobowitz v. United States, 424 F.2d 555 (Ct. CI. 1970); In re Rath Packing Co., 14
N.L.R.B. 805, 817 (1939); see Glaros v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 416 F.2d 441 (5th
Cir. 1969) (hearsay corroborated by other evidence); NLRB v. Operating Engineers, Local 12,
25 Ad. L.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1969) (no objection raised to admission of hearsay).
85. E.g., Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.M. 5, 462 P.2d 139 (1969); Outagamie County
v. Town of Brooklyn, 18 Wis. 2d 303, 118 N.W.2d 201 (1962); see Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S.
269 (1949). Contra Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. Cl. 1969), criticized in Note,
Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in Administrative Hearings, 48 N.C.L. REv. 608
(1970).
86. Richardson v. Perales, 39 U.S.L.W. 4497 (U.S. May 3, 1971); Marmon v. Railroad
Retirement Bd., 218 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1955); Ellers v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 132 F.2d 636
(2d Cir. 1943). For an interesting reverse application of this principle, see Staskel v. Gardner,
274 F. Supp. 861, 863 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (hearsay not sufficient evidence to deny claim); Rios v.
Hackney, 294 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
87. Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 689, 699 (1964);
see FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948).
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evidence are examples of agency dependence on statistical averages to
determine facts in particular cases where legal or policy decisions are
not dependent upon exact determinations. For instance, survey
evidence indicating that from 9 to 100 percent of the public were
misled by respondent's advertising will support a finding that it
constitutes an unfair or deceptive act.as Still another example is the
fixing of a rate for commodities transported by one carrier on the
basis of costs incurred by similarly situated carriers. 9
(e) What is the administrative policy behind the statute being
enforced? The range of necessary reliability is affected by the type of
policy which the administrative hearing is designed to promote. For
example, the social security and workmen's compensation programs
are intended to provide benefits quickly at low cost. The refusal to
rely upon affidavit facts in such hearings would run counter to the
purposes for which the'statutes are designed.9"
When focusing on these criteria, it is essential to consider the
central point that evaluation of hearsay and other technically
incompetent evidence cannot be accomplished in the abstract; the
evidence must be examined in the light of the particular record. This
includes, at a minimum, an examination of the quality and quantity of
the evidence on each side, as well as the circumstantial setting of the
case. 9
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Once the agency has determined that legally incompetent evidence
can be admitted and relied upon in making an administrative
decision, it might appear that the subject of hearsay evidence in
administrative hearings has been exhausted. While the agency's
88. E.g., Arrow Metal Prods. Corp., 53 F.T.C. 721, 727, 733-34, affdper curiam, 249 F.2d
83 (3d Cir. 1957); Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 49 F.T.C. 263 (1952), affd, 208 F.2d 382, 386-87
(7th Cir. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 940 (1955).
89. New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 197-98 (1923); Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v.
United States, 225 F. Supp. 584 (D. Colo. 1964); see 2 1. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION 376-80 (1931). See also Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir.
1967), modified sub nom., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
90. Several states have also adopted specific statutes governing the use of copies of
documentary evidence. See GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-1 16(b) (Supp. 1970); HAWAII REV. STAT.
ANN. § 91-10(1)-(2) (1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 252(b) (1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
30A, § 11(4) (1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(176) (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 15.0419(2) (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-914(3) (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
75, § 310(2) (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.450(1) (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-35-
10(b) (1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04.100(2) (1965).
91. For a review of the cases, see Jacobowitz v. United States, 424 F.2d 555 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
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admission and use of legally incompetent evidence is subject to
judicial review, this review of administrative determinations of fact
should be confined 'to determining whether the decision is supported
by the evidence in the record. Judicial review of administrative
evidence has not been so limited, however. As a substitute for rules of
admissibility, courts apply the so-called "substantial evidence" rule
to judicial review of agency action in seeking to assure fairness to the
parties.
As applied to administrative findings, the substantial evidence rule
possesses two branches, one of which is sound, and the other unsound.
The first consists of an overall standard of review of the findings of
fact. In essence, it does not differ materially from the "sufficiency"
standard applied in judicial review of jury verdicts.92 In this sense,
substantial evidence is that evidence
affording a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be
reasonably inferred. . . .[I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a
jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from
it is one of fact for the jury.3
This standard measures both the quantitative and qualitative
sufficiency of the evidence.94 Its proper application takes into account
the rationale of the exclusionary rules of evidence, the reliability of the
hearsay evidence-including the opportunity for cross-examination,
the availability of better evidence, and the appearance of
corroborating evidence-and the needs of administrative economy.
According to the leading opinion of Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB,95 this judicially evolved standard of review of administrative
fact-finding is incorporated into the Administrative Procedure Act,
except that the Act broadens judicial review to assure that the
reviewing court takes "into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight." 6 In other words, the reviewing court should
92. E.g., Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53,57 (1949); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at
317-19.
93. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299-300 (1939); see
Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 618-21 (1966). The substantial evidence test applied to jury
verdicts and administrative findings is in contrast to appellate review of a court's fact
determinations in a nonjury case where such findings are measured by the "clearly erroneous"
test. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); NLRB v.
Southland Mfg. Co., 201 F.2d 244, 246 (4th Cir. 1952); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 429-32
(1969).
94. See BENJAMIN 192; 1 COOPER 404-05.
95. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
96. Id. at 488.
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review the whole record to determine whether it contains a rational
basis for the findings of fact supporting the agency's decision.97
In reviewing administrative decisions, some appellate
courts-primarily state-added a second branch to the substantial
evidence test, warping the test into a rigid rule for denying credibility
to uncorroborated hearsay evidence. Known as the "legal residuum
rule" because it requires that an administrative finding of fact be
supported by some evidence admissible in a jury trial-that is, by a
residuum of legal evidence-it has been severely criticized by scholars,
and its application has strained judicial reasoning.9"
The earliest case applying this rule illustrates its weakness. In
Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 9 the New York Court of Appeals
reversed a workmen's compensation award in a death case where the
commission's finding of accidental injury was based wholly on
hearsay testimony of statements by the deceased workman. The
workman, who developed delirium tremens and died within six days,
had told his wife, a neighbor, and his family and hospital physicians
that a 300-pound cake of ice had fallen upon his abdomen. Each party
related this story to the commission. However, the case record also
contained substantial contradictory evidence. The workman's helper
on the ice truck, along with two cooks working in the saloon where the
ice was delivered, testified that they were present at the time and place
where the accident presumably occurred but they neither saw nor
heard the incident. In addition, the hospital physicians found no
bruises, discolorations, or abrasions on the workman's body. In light
of the lack of testimonial or physical corroboration of the workman's
story which probably would have been available if the hearsay
statement had been trustworthy, the obvious self-interest in the
deseased's statement, and the possibility of the workman's being
inebriated when he made his statement, the court reasonably could
have ruled that credulity could not be placed in the supporting hearsay
evidence and that such evidence did not, therefore, constitute
substantial evidence. Instead, after noting that the commission could
"accept any evidence that is offered" under the New York
Workmen's Compensation Act, the court laid down the rule that
97. The intricacies and problems which arise in applying this standard are not within our
concern here. See generally-4 DAvis ch. 29 (1958). For a review of state authority which also is
extremely critical of the substantial evidence standard, see 2 CooPER 722-55.
98. BENJAMIN 189-92; 2 DAVIs § 14.10 (Supp. 1965); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 39 (3d ed.
1940). But see 1 COOPER 410-12.
99. 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).
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"still in the end there must be a residuum of legal evidence to support
the claim before an award can be made."'10 It therefore held that
when substantial evidence is required, "hearsay testimony is not
evidence." 101
The residuum rule is both logically unsound and administratively
impractical. In a trial before a lay jury hearsay admitted without
objection is given its natural, probative effect and may be the sole
support for a verdict. But under the residuum rule hearsay cannot
support a decision by an expert administrator. The rule ignores the
reliability of technically incompetent evidence, rendering all such
evidence ineffective unless corroborated. However, if corroborated,
regardless of how slight the legal evidence, the same hearsay evidence
will provide the substantial evidence needed to support the
administrative finding.
This rule may also become a trap for the unwary, particularly
where the hearing officer is not expert in the rules of evidence or where
the parties are not represented by counsel. In fact it encourages trial
examiners to apply the hearsay rule and exclude probative evidence in
order to avoid possible error. In its instinctive protection of fairness in
administrative hearings, through assuring that the decision is
supported by evidence subject to confrontation and cross-
examination, the residuum rule seems unassailable. What it fails to
consider, however, is that much "legal" evidence within the hearsay
exceptions is equally untested. Yet the latter is accepted even in jury
trials because of its probable reliability. Consequently the residuum
rule's mechanical prohibition against uncorroborated hearsay is
unsound. Its sound objectives can be secured through the sensitivity of
hearing officers and the wise application of the substantial evidence
test which measures the quantity and quality of the supporting
evidence regardless of its category or label.
As others have recounted at substantial length, the residuum rule
is not accepted by most federal courts. 10 2 The states are still divided
100. Id. at441, 113 N.E. at509.
101. Id.
102. 2 DAVIS § 14.11 (Supp. 1965). Compare Cohen v. Perales, 416 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir.
1969), with Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. CI. 1969), noted in 1970 DuKE L.J. 153-
56. But see Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938) (dictum) ("[m]ere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence"); Weaver v. Finch,
306 F. Supp. 1185 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
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over its validity. 0
OPINION EVIDENCE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY1
0 4
The presentation of expert and non-expert opinions is increasingly
common in administrative hearings. Medical issues arising in
workmen's compensation claims are often complex, technical, and
beyond the knowledge of either the hearing officer or the agency. An
administrative decision to license a hydroelectric plant, to locate a
public housing project, to discontinue a bus line, or to grant a liquor
license frequently evokes strong community concern.1°5 The public
views advanced are likely to be expressed in terms of opinion and to
include reference to the views of others. To deny the public an
opportunity to testify is to invite public rejection of the agency
decision.
The general admissibility of expert and non-expert testimony in
administrative hearings is no longer open to question, but doubt still
exists regarding the weight an expert's views should be given.0 6 For a
time agencies and reviewing courts followed early judicial reasoning
and refused to hear expert testimony on the very question that the
agency was created to decide. 107 Other courts took the position that it
would be unfair for an agency to rely on its own expertise or the expert
testimony of its staff when their opinions were contradicted by outside
experts. 08 In rejecting these contradictory appeals to ignorance,
courts now recognize legislative intention to establish expert agencies.
103. See Tauber v. County Bd. of Appeals, 262 A.2d 513, 518 (Md. Ct. App. 1970);
Neuman v. City of Baltimore, 251 Md. 92, 246 A.2d 583 (1968); I CooPER 406-10; 2
DAVIS § 14.12 (Supp. 1965).
104. See generally 2 DAVIS § 14.13 (Supp. 1965).
105. Cf. Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir, 1966); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1966).
106. See Keller v. FTC, 132 F.2d 59, 61 (7th Cir. 1942); Gloyd v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d
649, 650 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 633 (1933); Davis & Randall, Inc. v. United States,
219 F. Supp. 673, 679 (W.D.N.Y. 1963).
107. Cf. Corn v. State Bar, 68 Cal. 2d 461, 67 Cal. Rptr. 401, 439 P.2d 313 (1968); C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 12. The courts have generally discarded the former view that
agency opinions need supporting expert testimony and agencies are now free to use their own
judgment. Compare, e.g., Boggs & Bahl v. Commissioner, 34 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1929), with Kline
v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 697 (1943).




Therefore, agency decisions which rely on the agency's own expertise
are upheld when the respondent offers no contrary expert testimony or
when expert testimony offered by staff members and outside experts
conflicts.It 9 Some courts have gone even further and given excessive
deference to the knowledge of the administrative agency by upholding
its decisions in the face of uncontradicted expert testimony to the
contrary. 10 However, the demands of fairness are now generally
accepted, and an agency seeking to rely on its expertise must present
expert testimony subject to cross-examination on the record or give
the respondent fair notification that official notice will be taken of
such "facts." 1
Perhaps because of this very limited judicial supervision, agency
reliance on opinion and expert testimony often is at best vacillating
and at worst irresponsible. Again the Federal Trade Commission's
false advertising hearings are revealing and illustrative."' To prove
109. E.g., Contractors v. Pillsbury, 150 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1945); Pacific Power & Light
Co. v. FPC, 141 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1944); see McCarthy v. Sawyer-Goodman Co., 194 Wis.
198, 215 N.W. 824 (1927).
This is an exceedingly brief summary of what can be a complex issue. For an excellent
analysis and attempt to balance the right of respondent to a decision based on "record"
evidence with the administrative need to avoid unproductive hearings, see Davis & Randall, Inc.
v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 673 (W.D.N.Y. 1963), where Judge Friendly applied the
following test:
Without wishing to be held to the letter, we suggest that a rejection of unopposed
testimony by a qualified and disinterested expert on a matter susceptible of reasonably
precise measurement, without the agency's developing its objections at a hearing, ought
to be upheld only when the agency's uncommunicated criticisms appear to the reviewing
court to be both so compelling and so deeply held that the court can be fairly sure the
agency would not have been affected by anything the witness could have said had he
known of them, and the coprt would have been bound to affirm, despite the expert's
hypothetical rebuttal, out of deference for the agency's judgment on so technical a
matter. Id. at 679.
110. See, e.g., Arc Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 98, 103 (8th Cir. 1961); Gaddy v.
State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts, 397 S.W.2d 347, 355 (Mo. 1965). But cf. L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 608-10 (1965). Judicial approval-of agency
reliance upon its own expertise is inappropriate, of course, where the expert opinion is patently
fallacious or "intrinsically nonpersuasive." See Davis & Randall, Inc. v. United States, 219 F.
Supp. 673, 678 (W.D.N.Y. 1963); Sternberger v. United States, 401 F.2d 1012, 1016 (Ct. Cl.
1968). Approval is equally inappropriate where the opinion is based on inferences from facts in
the record. Interstate Power Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 372, 385 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 967 (1957); see Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1945).
111. E.g., Moschogianis v. Concrete Material & Mfg. Co., 179 Minn. 177, 228 N.W. 607
(1930); see notes 188-209 infra and accompanying text.
112. For a more complete description of FTC reliance on opinion and expert testimony, see




that an advertisement is false or deceptive, government counsel must
show that the advertisement made a promise which respondent's
product or service failed to meet. In other words, the agency must
show what the consuming public understood from the advertisement.
The obvious method of proof would seem to be a scientific survey
exploring the reactions of those who either relied upon the
advertisement or were within the target area and could have been
affected by it. Such surveys are rarely relied upon in Commission
hearings; even when used, they are usually questionable samplings
prepared at the behest of one partisan. Instead, the parties rely on a
number of less significant factors: the Commission's experience and
expertise, thereby adopting what is more accurately described as the
"hunch" or "intuitive" approach; dictionary definitions which tell
only the possible or preferred interpretation of words used in an
advertisement, not how they are actually understood; trade
understandings which are hardly reflective of consumer perception; or
the opinions of a parade of consumer witnesses, testimony which
needlessly prolongs the hearing and demonstrates only that
somewhere, somehow, inventive counsel may find someone who will
interpret an ad as counsel desires. Despite academic criticism of these
sloppy practices, little change is discernible. On the other hand, if
agencies were required to try cases quickly and to enforce their
decisions meaningfully-developments which public pressures will, I
think, soon demand-the agencies would be forced to make expert
opinion readily available to all parties and to develop routine
procedures for validating expert views." 3 A fair analysis of
administrative hearings in recent decades must conclude that agencies
have increasingly opened their doors to expert opinion without
contemporaneously assuring that these opinions should be relied
upon.
EXCLUSION OF PRIVILEGED TESTIMONY
Witnesses in administrative hearings have the same general duty
to give testimony which is incumbent on all citizens in judicial trials;
"the public has a right to every man's testimony.""' Because the
demand comes from the community as a whole, rather than from the
113. The problem is not unique to administrative law. See, e.g., Note, The Doctor in Court:
Impartial Medical Testimony, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 728 (1967).
114. 12 D. COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 675, 693 (1812). quoted in 4 J. Wiro~RE,
EVIDENCE 2965-66 (1st ed. 1905).
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parties, and because the obligation is essential to any search for
justice, "all privileges of exemption from this duty are
exceptional.""' Read literally, the APA's provision in section 7(c)
that "[a]ny oral or documentary evidence may be received"" 6
authorizes the receipt of privileged evidence in administrative
hearings. 1 7 Nevertheless, administrative hearings have generally
followed the judicial lead in recognizing numerous exceptions to this
obligation to testify. Such exceptions are of two kinds. A few, such as
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence and the assertion of the
right against self-incrimination, are based upon constitutional
commands. Others, such as the privileges protecting attorney-client
and marital communications, are founded upon the need to protect
interests without constitutional dimension yet these relationships have
sufficient social importance to warrant the sacrifice of full factual
disclosure.
Even though administrative agencies do not as a rule impose
criminal penalties, their adjudicative procedures are not exempt from
constitutional limitations. In Camara v. Municipal Court"8 and See
v. Seattle"' the Supreme Court applied the fourth amendment's
strictures against unreasonable search and seizure of property to
administrative health and fire inspections. 12 While these cases
involved direct challenges to administrative inspections, it is also clear
that the constitutional objection is available at the hearing even
though no objection is asserted at the time the inspection is made.' 2'
115. 8 J. VIGMORE, EVIDENCE 73 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
117. Professor Davis has made the provocative suggestion that section 7(c) authorizes
agency rejection of unsound or questionable privileges. 2 DAVIS § 14.08, at 287 (1958). It seems
doubtful, however, that this provision can reasonably be interpreted as addressing itself to the
question of testimonial privilege; rather, the legislative history suggests that its purpose is to
avoid binding administrative agencies to technical rules of evidence. 92 CONG. REc. 2157, 5653
(1946); see ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 76 (1947).
Legislative omission, moreover, is seldom convincing support for deviation from common law
practices. See CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961).
118. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
119. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
120. See generally Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801
(1965); Note, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521 (1968).
121. See Finn's Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 647, 249 N.E.2d 440,
301 N.Y.S.2d 584, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969); Leogrande v. State Liquor Auth., 25 App.
Div. 2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1966), rev'don other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 418, 227 N.E.2d 302,
280 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1967); Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Leonardziak, 210 Pa. Super. 511,
233 A.2d 606 (1967); cf. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260,57 Cal. Rptr. 623,425
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For example, in Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC,"' the Seventh Circuit
set aside an FTC order on the ground that the Commission's
acceptance and use of corporate documents, known to be stolen on
behalf of the government, violated the fourth amendment. This
constitutional protection extends beyond purloined documents. Many
cases uphold the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
in administrative proceedings.1 23 However, the self-incrimination
privilege has been limited. First, it applies only to natural persons and
therefore does not protect corporations and other legal entities. 24
Second, it can be circumvented by the grant of immunity from
criminal prosecution.12 5 Federal agencies commonly have been
authorized to grant such immunity and then compel a witness to
testify even if the evidence implicates him. 28 Third, the privilege
against self-incrimination is also avoided if the information is sought
P.2d 223 (1967). Compare Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners, 241 Cal. App. 2d 246, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 304 (1966) (dictum), with Pierce v. Board of Nursing Educ. & Nurse Reg. 255 Cal. App.
2d 463, 63 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1967) (dictum). Contra NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d
360, 364 (9th Cir. 1969) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); Solomon v.
Liquor Control Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 2d 31, 212 N.E.2d 595, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 928 (1966)
(relying on the discredited "privilege" rationale).
122. 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968).
123. E.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Smith v. United States, 337
U.S. 137 (1949). In this situation, the respondent fears the potential administrative order less
than the subsequent use of his testimony in a criminal proceeding.
124. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
125. See Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1964):
No person shall be excused from ...testifying ... on the ground .. .that the
testimony of evidence . . . may tend to criminate him . . . .But no person shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty of forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or
otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena ....
See also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896);
Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional
Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963) (noting 44 federal witness immunity acts). Most of these
statutes were repealed and incorporated with substantial modification into the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, § 6004, 84 Stat. 922. Immunity may still be granted to witnesses
appearing before administrative agencies, but approval of the Attorney General is first required.
For an example concerning the continuing controversy surrounding the grant of immunity, see
Piceirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548.
126. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6 (1948) (citing 26 federal statutes). Similar
state statutes are common. E.g., ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 120 § 453.10a (1967); see Halpin v. Scotti,
415 111. 104, 112 N.E.2d 91 (1953). However, application of the immunity provision does not
preclude an agency from issuing an order against persons so testifying, even though the order is




from records "required to be kept."' However, this avoidance of the
self-incrimination exception has been narrowed and possibly
eliminated as a practical matter by recent Supreme Court rulings.128
The courts have also given some exploratory consideration of the
application of other fifth and sixth amendment exclusionary rules to
administrative proceedings, but few definitive determinations have
been issued. Some agencies have taken action to protect constitutional
rights, at least where criminal sanctions are possible. For example,
Internal Revenue Service agents must now provide Miranda2 9
warnings that an accused has a right to remain silent and seek counsel
in order to protect the admissibility of a taxpayer's statements or of
evidence discovered as a result of the investigation. 3 ' Agency
adjudications have in general only skirted these issues, and a host of
unanswered questions remain.13 '
127. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948); see Meltzer, Required Records, The
McCarran Act, And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 687 (1951).
128. In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62 (1968), the Court upheld assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination as a defense
to criminal prosecutions for violations of both the registration and taxing provisions of the
federal wagering tax statutes. The obligation to pay taxes could not be separated from the
information and incriminatory purposes of the statutes. The required records exception set forth
in Shapiro was not applicable, the Court concluded, because the three premises of that doctrine
had not been met. They are:
First, the purposes of the United States' inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second,
information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the
regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have
assumed "public apsects" which render them at least analogous to public documents.
390 U.S. at 67-68.
Accord, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968)
(invalidating registration provisions of the National Firearms Act). But see United States v.
Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969).
129. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
130. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1969); United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111,
1117 & n.13 (7th Cir. 1969). See generally Andrews, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax
Investigations Under Escobedo and Miranda: The "'Critical Stage," 53 IOWA L. REv. 1074
(1568). On the other hand, Miranda warnings have not generally been extended to other
administrative investigations because they are not criminal in nature and do not involve the
"custodial" feature so critical to Miranda. See, e.g., Harris v. Smith, 418 F.2d 899 (2d Cir.
1969); F.J. Buckner Corp. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084
(1969); Wilber J. Allingham, 164.N.L.R.B. 30 (1967); In re A- 19 AD. L.2D 372 (Bd. Imm.
App. 1966); Mumford v. Department of Alcoholic Bye. Cont., 258 Cal. App. 2d 49, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 495 (4th Dist. 1968). See generally Note, Extending Miranda to Administrative
Investigations, 56 VA. L. REv. 690 (1970). But see United States v. Casias, 306 F. Supp. 167 (D.
Colo. 1969) (draft board).
131. For example, attempts to secure the appointment of counsel for an indigent respondent
in administrative proceedings have met with only minimal success. Compare American
Chinchilla Corp., 26 AD. L.2D 284 (FTC Dec. 23, 1969), noted in 1970 Duca L.J. 112; 84
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On the federal level, neither the Congress nor the agencies have
focused on whether administrative agencies must recognize
testimonial privileges not constitutionally required. In a leading case
concerning the enforcement of an SEC subpoena, Judge Learned
Hand expressly assumed that agency proceedings are "subject to the
same testimonial privileges as judicial proceedings."' 32 Except for the
Ninth Circuit, other federal courts have either made the same
assumption or considered the matter a question of federal law.' At
any rate, agencies have generally accorded privileged treatment to
communications between attorney and client, physician and patient,
and husband and wife.' But they have not been anxious to extend
such privileges. For example, the accountant-client privilege
recognized by a few states has not been accepted by federal agencies.'
Business secrets have been protected grudgingly, although agencies
have become more sophisticated in recent years in protecting both the
witness and the adjudicative process by in camera receipt of sensitive
data. 136
The government secrets privilege is particularly important in
administrative hearings. Any attempt to probe the government's case
by discovery, subpoena of agency witnesses, or cross-examination is
quickly met by claims that the information sought is privileged.
HARV. L. REV. 1066 (1971), with Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211,221 (9th Cir. 1969), and Boruski v.
SEC, 340 F.2d 991,992 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 943 (1965).
132. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
133. See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
951 (1963); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953);
United States v. Threlkeld, 251 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965); In re Kearney, 227 F. Supp.
174 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Contra Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); In re Breto, 231 F.
Supp. 529, 531 (D. Minn. 1964) (Baird applied pursuant to stipulation of the parties). For a
perceptive student comment questioning the accuracy of this assessment of the choice of law
problem, see Comment, Privileged Communications Before Federal Administrative Agencies:
The Law Applied in the District Courts, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 395 (1964).
134. See, e.g., (1) attorney-client: Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America,, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C.
1961); Viviano Macaroni Co., [1965-67 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,467 (FTC
1966); cf Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914
(1950); John A. Iseli, I C.A.A. 715 (1940); (2) husband-wife; Cahan v. Carr, 47 F.2d 604 (9th
Cir. 1931); Gilles v. Del Guercio, 150 F. Supp. 804 (S.D. Cal. 1957); Peterson, Attorney.Client
Privileges in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967). Contra Air
Transp. Ass'n [1960-64 Transfer Binder] Av. L. REp. 21,355 (1963).
135. See e.g., FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962); Falsone v. United
State, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 846 U.S. 864 (1953).
136. See generally E. Gellhorn, Business Secrets in Administrative Agency Adjudication, 22
AD. L. REv. 515 (1970).
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Actually, the government secrets privilege is an umbrella for three
types of information: state secrets involving military or diplomatic
information; requests that executive officers testify; and official
government information which may range from the identity of
informers and internal management materials to staff studies
unrelated to any litigation. 37 Only the third omnibus exception has
special significance for administrative adjudications; the judicial rules
applicable to state secrets and executive testimony are routinely
followed in agency hearings. An exploration of all the twists and turns
given agency applications of the omnibus exception is beyond the
scope of this paper.1se A fair summary of agency practice, however, is
that exculpatory information in an agency's possession or file data
which may aid respondent's preparation or presentation of his case
must be disclosed by the agency. 19 The agency's alternative is to drop
the prosecution against the respondent."' Anything less would violate
the commands of procedural due process which every adjudication
must observe.' But beyond this simple generalization which no one
seriously disputes,4 2 neither cases nor commentaries have attempted
to suggest precisely what the duty to disclose includes.4 3 When does
137. See 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2374, 2378 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Hardin,
Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879 (1962); Zagel, The State Secrets
Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1966)!
138. For an explanation of one agency's approach, see E. Gellhorn, The Treatment of
Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Commission: The Hearing, 116 U. PA. L. Rv.
401, 423-27 (1968); E. Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal
Trade Commission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 113, 157-77 (1968); cf. Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc., v. United States, 413 F.2d 568 (Ct. Cl. 1969). The Freedom of
Information Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 250, as amended, section 3 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(Supp. V, 1970), has served to ease access to some agency files for the public, but it has had little
effect on agency adjudication.
139. E.g., Sperandeo v. Dairy Employees Local 537, 334 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1964); NLRB
v. Capital Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F.
Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp. v. FTC, 233 F. Supp. 660, 666
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); cf. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967);
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963); United States v. Bryant, 39 U.S.L.W. 2455
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 1971).
140. See Sperandeo v. Dairy Employees Local 537, 334 F.2d 381, 385 (10th Cir. 1964); cf.
United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944); Berger & Krash, Government
Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 1451, 1453 (1950).
141. See, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1940).
142. E.g., BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 375, at A-8 (1968); cf. Note, The Duty
of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 858 (1960); Note, The
Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 Yale L.J. 136 (1964).
143. For a useful discussion in another context, see Weinstein, Judicial Notice and the Duty
to Disclose Adverse Information, 51 IowA L. REv. 807 (1966).
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information become exculpatory? Can criteria be developed, or is this
subject akin to obscenity and seemingly beyond anything but the
vaguest definition? Is the duty limited to government counsel or does a
corresponding duty apply to nonparties, especially when the latter are
the unseen de facto charging parties? Should a respondent have a
correlative obligation to disclose incriminating data since the
proceedings are civil and, at least as to corporate respondents, there is
no right against self-incrimination? Even if these questions can be
answered satisfactorily, what procedures should be adopted to assure
that exculpatory data is revealed? Again, this is an area ripe for
further analysis and discussion by an appropriate vehicle such as the
Administrative Conference.' Although the cases still reflect only a
glimmer of concern for such disclosure, as agencies further develop
summary techniques or impose upon respondent the burden of
proving its innocence-as I suspect demands for a cleaner
environment and for fairer business-consumer relations will
require-these questions should receive increasing attention.
Almost half the states provide that rules of privilege applicable in
court proceedings must apply in administrative hearings.' Courts
and agencies in other states have reached the same position as a
matter of policy.' The scope of the statutory recognition of
privileged communications in the states tends to exceed the
testimonial exception recognized by federal courts." 7 Where agency
proceedings are excepted or where no statutory mandate exists, state
agencies have relaxed or avoided testimonial privileges where the
rationale for the privilege is weak or not particularly appropriate. For
example, several states have held that the physician-patient privilege
cannot bar a workmen's compensation commission's search for the
truth.'
144. The initial consultant's report on discovery to a committee of the Administrative
Conference attempted to formulate standards for disclosure of exculpatory data, but both the
standard and the discussion were deleted from the final recommendation and report. Compare
Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, Consultant's Report to the Committee on
Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings, Administrative Conference of the United States 76-
89 (January 1969), with id. (March 1970) and Recommendation No. 21-Discovery in Agency
Adjudication (adopted June 3, 1970).
145. 1 COOPER 396-97 (collecting statutory authorites).
146. E.g., New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940);
BENJAMIN 171.
147. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 310(l) (1970).
148. See, e.g., Danussi v. Easy Wash, Inc., 270 Minn. 465, 134 N.W.2d 138 (1965);
Cooper's, Inc. v. Long, 224 So. 2d 866 (Miss. 1969).
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In summary, the trend appears to be toward narrowing
testimonial privileges in administrative hearings and, where practical,
toward resort to alternative protections against unnecessary public
disclosure.
PRESENTATION OF CASE: BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
The customary common law rule that the moving party has the
burden of proof-including not only the burden of going forward but
also the burden of persuasion-is generally observed in administrative
hearings. Section 7(c) of the APA, for example, provides: "Except as
otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the
burden of proof."' State courts have reached the same result in
connection with state administrative proceedings.110 In most hearings
the burden of persuasion is met by the usual civil case standard of "a
preponderance of the evidence." However, where grave issues of
personal security are at stake in an administrative hearing as in a
deportation proceeding, the Supreme Court has imposed the equity
standard that the government establish its allegations by "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence."' 51
Increasingly, the courts are also employing the substantial
evidence standard to impose a special burden of proof on
administrative agencies distributing compensation benefits. A series
of cases involving social security and workmen's compensation
proceedings have required that the agency accept the claimant's
uncontroverted evidence even though the claimant has the burden of
proof..' 2 Nor can these cases be explained away on the grounds of
149. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
150. E.g., International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 81
N.M. 280, 466 P.2d 557 (1970); Crossroads Recreation, Inc. v. Broz, 4 N.Y.2d 39, 172
N.Y.S.2d 129, 149 N.E.2d 65 (1958); State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,
250 N.C. 421, 109 S.E.2d 253 (1959); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Sansom House
Enterprises, Inc., 378 Pa. 385, 106 A.2d 404 (1954).
151. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); see Jaffe,
Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 HARV. L. REv. 914 (1966).
152. E.g., Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1968), rehearing en banc denied, 404
F.2d 1059, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960);
Stanley v. Moan, 71 Ariz. 359,227 P.2d 389 (1951); Dole v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 311,
204 P.2d 462 (1949). The recent social security cases from just one federal circuit, the sixth,
include: York v. Gardner, 397 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1968); Nelms v. Gardner, 386 F.2d 971 (6th
Cir. 1967); Colwell v. Gardner, 386 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1967); Branham v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 614
(6th Cir. 1967); Sayers v. Gardner, 380 F.2d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir. 1967) (noting "the repeated
necessity of reversing the Secretary [of HEW] in these cases"); Erickson v. Ribicoff, 305 F.2d
638 (6th Cir. 1962); Hall v. Flemming, 289 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1961); King v. Flemming, 289
F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1961). See generally L. JAFFE, supra note 110, at 608.
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judicial acceptance of uncontradicted medical testimony in support of
the claim, since the agencies are also dealing with malingering and
false claims. On the other hand, reviewing courts are more concerned
with the remedial (insurance?) purposes of the statutes and the
comparative inability of the claimant to present additional proof.I5
Similar tendencies occasionally appear in such diverse areas as police
suspension matters' 5 and draft exemption cases' 5 where the courts
have given increasing scrutiny to the overall fairness of administrative
adjudications. It would seem safe to predict the spread of this
tendency to less formalized adjudications 15 where the agency deals
with an individual's liberties or claims.
These cases can also be viewed as establishing a presumption in
certain administrative adjudications since they affect the burden of
proof. The history of workmen's compensation illustrates this
alternative analysis. Although many state acts have created a
presumption in favor of the claimant, several state courts formerly
gave these acts no such effect. 57 In interpreting a federal
compensation act in Del Vecchio v. Bowers,'5 s the Supreme Court has
held that this "benefit" presumption was sufficient to carry
claimant's burden of persuasion in the absence of opposing evidence.
However, once rebuttal evidence is introduced, the statutory
presumption is overcome, and the agency must decide the case solely
on the evidence in the record.'5 9 Similar analysis supports the
presumption of the correctness of official administrative action. 160
On the other hand, precisely the opposite trend is beginning to
surface in administrative adjudications where the activities of business
respondents are tested. For example, an advertiser now has the burden
153. However, where the evidence is likely to be available only to respondent, either the
burden of persuasion or of going forward may be required of respondent. See, e.g., Day v.
National Transp. Safety Bd., 414 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1969); Smyth v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 291 F. Supp. 568, 573 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
154. E.g., Kelly v. Murphy, 20 N.Y.2d 205, 229 N.E.2d 40 (1967).
155. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 396 (1953); cf. Mulloy v. United States, 398
U.S. 410 (1970). But see Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. at 399 (dissenting opinion).
156. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969).
157. E.g., Joseph v. United Kimono Co., 194 App. Div. 568, 185 N.Y.S. 700 (1921).
158. 296 U.S. 280 (1935).
159. Id. at 286. This view now prevails in the state courts. E.g., Cellurale's Case, 333 Mass.
37, 127 N.E.2d 787 (1955); 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 80.33
(1952). This also illustrates that problems of burden of proof are, in essence, often questions of
substantive law. 2 DAVIs § 14.14, at 328 (1958); see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324
U.S. 793 (1945); 2 DAVIS § 15.04, at 372-73 (1958).
160. E.g., Goldfarb v. Department of Revenue, 411 Ill 573, 104 N.E.2d 606 (1952); Cupples
Hesse Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 329 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1959).
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of establishing any advertising claim, and if it is the type of claim
whose truth can be determined only by scientific tests-for example, a
claim that respondent's tires will stop a car 25 percent quicker than
other tires-the advertiser's fully-documented proof must antedate
the representation; the prosecuting agency need only show that the
claim was made. 6' As increasing weight is given to the public interest
in fair dealing and in a healthier environment, we can expect further
developments either imposing strict liability on certain business
activities' or requiring that the business establish by substantial
evidence that its practices should not be prohibited.
PRESENTATION 'OF CASE: WRITTEN EVIDENCE AND CROSS-
EXAMINATION
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of many administrative
hearings, particularly in contrast to nonjury trials, is the substitution
of written evidence for oral testimony. This written evidence takes
several forms. In its simplest and least productive aspect, some
witnesses appear, if at all, simply for cross-examination, with the
written questions and answers read into the record in lieu of the usual
oral question-answer format. This "canned dialogue" has been
savagely and justly criticized as an abomination leading to the
withholding of the true facts from the hearing examiner and assuring
that the case will be decided on grounds other than the evidence in the
record.'6 But if applied more sensitively, written evidence can expedite
161. The Federal Trade Commission's theory in recent complaints is that an advertiser
making performance claims without substantiating proof in hand shows a reckless disregard for
the rights of the public. The conduct is therefore illegal whether or not the claim is ultimately
established. See, e.g., Firestone Tire &-Rubber Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
RaP. 19,209 (FTC 1970); id. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,370 (FTC 1970); id. (Initial Deci-
sion, May 5, 1971) (dismissing complaint). The theory is supported by Heinz W. Kirchner, 63
F.T.C. 1282, 1294-95 (1963).
162. Cf. 18 C.F.R. § 250.43 (1970) (Department of Interior regulations imposing strict
liability on off-shore oil well lessees for pollution damage).
163. As one leading administrative practitioner describes the impact of canned testimony:
I don't believe that I am wholly unique in being put immediately to sleep when it is read.
That tedium is eliminated when the written testimony is used, without reading, as direct
examination subject to oral cross. I have not, however, yet seen an examiner who has
really mastered the unspoken direct testimony. The 25% that is really strong won't be
touched in cross-examination and cannot easily be brought out in redirect, so in most
cases the examiner proceeds until briefing time, at the best, and forever at the worst, in
amiable ignorance of the heart of the testimony. The few hours of direct examination that
are saved by written direct testimony come at too high a price. Gardner, Shrinking the
Big Case, 16 AD. L. REv. 5, 12-13 (1963).
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and simplify formal administrative proceedings through reducing the
controversy to verified written statements which are then exchanged
by the parties for the purpose of rebuttal."4 Federal administrative
agencies have frequently relied upon this technique; the ICC has done
so for almost half a century. 65 With the cooperation of the parties,
this procedure can result in greater precision than where the facts are
presented orally.
The ICC's written procedures are probably more sophisticated
than those of any other agency. 6' Early in the 1920's, this commission
abbreviated the usual oral hearing before a commissioner or examiner
through the use of a "shortened" procedure. Upon consent of the
parties, oral testimony was dispensed with, and decision was rendered
upon stipulated, sworn statements of fact. Despite encomiums from
administrative law experts, this procedure did not prove particularly
successful, since the parties could avoid the shortened procedure at
any time by requesting a formal hearing. Consequently, in 1942 the
ICC substituted a "modified" procedure whereby each party
submitted his case in writing for the purpose of obtaining agreement
on as many facts as possible. The parties then confined their oral
testimony to the remaining points in dispute. While more successful
than the "shortened" procedure, this modified procedure did not
eliminate a formal hearing when the parties could not agree on the
facts. In time, the modified procedure was streamlined into an
extraordinary administrative version of summary judgment. Under
rule 45 of the ICC's current procedure, any party may request use of
the modified procedure by filing a verified statement setting forth the
facts, arguments, and exhibits on which he relies.'67 The opposing
party must either admit or deny each material allegation, explaining
164. See W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 100-15 (1941); SELECTED
REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-62, S. Doc. No.
24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1963); P. WOLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 37-48 (1963); FINAL
REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No.
8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70 (1941); Brown, Public Service Commission Procedure-A
Problem and a Suggestion, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1938).
165. State agencies have also made extensive use of written evidence. See 38 J. AM. JUDIC,
Soc. 61 (1954).
166. See Hosmer, Some Notes on a Perennial Procedural Problem, 5 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 275
(1938); Mohundro, Improvements in Procedure Before the Commission, 20 I.C.C. PRAC. J, 75,
79-81 (1952); Woll, The Development of Shortened Procedure in American Administrative
Law, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 56, 62-66 (1959); Three Letters on Procedure Before the I.C.C., 20
I.C.C. PRAC. J. 196 (1952).
167. 49 C.F.R. § 110045 (1970); see id. §§ 100.49-.50, .53.
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each exception he takes to the facts and argument of his adversary.
Unless there are material facts in dispute or the objecting party
explains why he cannot properly present his case by affidavits, a
decision will then be rendered on the written case. Note that this rule
exceeds the concept of summary judgment currently applied under
rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 68 by placing the
burden on the parties to prove that an oral hearing is necessary. 6 9 An
oral hearing is not presumed to be the proper method for hearing a
case.
Written evidence has been relied upon most successfully in rate or
price control proceedings, where economic and expert analysis rather
than sensorily-perceived phenomena provide the bulk of the
evidence. 70 Credibility based upon conflicting stories relating what
each witness observed is seldom involved. Often the advance
preparation of written evidence is limited to the contentions of the
party having the burden of proof; in others the opposing party's
evidence is included. The elimination of surprise cannot be objected to
since surprise has no proper place in the hearing when credibility is
not in issue. Cross-examination is not used to establish a party's case.
Its major purpose here is "not to reduce. . .[the expert] witness to a
shattered hulk by the admission of error, but to explore all of the
considerations entering into what must remain a matter of
judgment."'7
As explained by the Second Interim Administrative Conference,
the benefits of written evidence are manifold:
(1) [the] exchange of written evidence facilitates settlement techniques in
situations in which there is staff participation; (2) the hearing examiner, after
studying the direct evidence of the parties prior to hearing, can participate in
the case in an intelligent fashion, leading to more effective use of conference
techniques and more informed rulings at the hearing; (3) in a substantial
number of cases, particularly those of less moment, the parties may be satisfied
with their written presentations, and an oral hearing becomes unnecessary; and
(4) the efforts of the parties at the oral hearing, if one is necessary, are confined
to clarifying the major issues through informed cross-examination. Properly
handled, written procedures should result in a more adequate record being
produced in a shorter space of time.'7
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
169. See E. Gellhorn & Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84
HARV. L. REV. 612 (1971). The ICC's procedure has withstood attacks upon due process
grounds. E.g., Allied Van Lines Co. v. United States, 303 F. Sulp. 742 (C.D. Calif. 1969).
170. See SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-62, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1963).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 93.
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Section 7(c) of the APA recognizes the propriety of written
presentations with only limited cross-examination: "In rule making
or determining claims for money or benefits or applications for initial
licenses any agency may, when a party will not be prejudiced thereby,
adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in
written form." ' While denying the broad application of their
recommendation to all adjudications, some commentators have
suggested the use of written presentations by any agency in a type of
proceeding where the interest of any party is not prejudiced.,
Existing case authority on the point supports this conclusion.'
Where cross-examination is necessary for protection against
untrustworthy evidence, it cannot be avoided. Section 7(c) of the APA
specifically preserves the right of cross-examination in agency
adjudications: "A party is entitled . . . to conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the
facts."'7 State law is identical.17 Through this provision the APA
recognizes one of the fundamentals of a fair bearing-namely, a
reasonable opportunity to test and controvert adverse evidence
whether or not such evidence is a statement of opinion, observation,
or consideration of the witness. Cross-examination has several
potential uses: to bring out matters left untouched by direct
examination; to test the accuracy of a witness' perception as well as
his ability to observe; to probe his truthfulness; to question his
memory and narration; and to expose the basis of any opinions he has
expressed. In other words, "cross-examination is a means of getting
at the truth; it is not truth itself."'7 8 Unless credibility is directly in
issue-and then only on occasion--cross-examination invariably does
no more than demonstrate forensic talent or score trial points
irrelevant to the final decision. 17 9 As an experienced agency
practitioner, now an eminent federal judge, has observed: "Only
rarely . . . can you accomplish something devastating on cross-
examining an expert. More often it is love's labor lost."'8 0
173. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
174. See 2 DAVIS § 14.16 (1958); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 77-78 (1947).
175. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See also 2 DAVIS § 14.16 (1958).
176. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
177. See Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 67-68 & n.l, 217 A.2d 578,
585-86 & n.l (1966); 1 COOPER 371-79 (collecting cases).
178. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE 713.
179. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 30 (1954).
180. Leventhal, Cues and Compasses for Administrative Lawyers, 20 AD. L. REV. 237, 246
(1968); accord, Prettyman, Trying an Administrative Dispute, 45 VA. L. REV. 179, 190-91
(1959).
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Perception of this point is the key to a reconciliation of the right of
cross-examination with the seemingly inconsistent administrative
practice of relying on hearsay testimony and written evidence whether
or not the declarant is unavailable. The legislative history of the APA
clearly indicates that Congress was seeking to draw a line between an
unlimited right of unnecessary cross-examination and a reasonable
opportunity to test opposing evidence. 8' The test, stated abstractly, is
that cross-examination must be allowed when it is required for
determining the truth. If witness veracity and demeanor are not
critical, there is no requirement for cross-examination so long as
sufficient opportunity for rebuttal exists; if credibility is a key factor,
and the objecting party can show that the absence of cross-
examination of the witness may have prejudiced his case, the denial of
cross-examination could be fatal to an agency decision. 182 Statistical
compilations and surveys are admissible only if the person responsible
for-and having full knowledge of the preparation of-the exhibit is
available. In addition, the raw data upon which the exhibit is based
should be available to the opposing party. 183 One far-thinking
administrative lawyer has proposed that the right of the witness to
cross-examine be reduced to a privilege "to be granted only in the
virtually unlimited discretion of the hearing officer" as part of a
restructuring of the administrative hearing into a conference
proceeding where almost all the evidence would be submitted in
written form.' This proposal may prove to be the path of the future
in resolving economic disputes and sophisticated problems arising in
industry regulation.
Finally, administrative agencies are required to apply the "Jencks
rule"-namely, that after a government witness has testified, the
181. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 208-09, 271 (1946); ATTORNEY GENERAl'S
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 77-78 (1947).
182. E.g., In re Chapman Radio & Television Co., 6 F.C.C.2d 768 (1967); accord, Richard-
son v. Perales, 39 U.S.L.W. 4497 (U.S. May 3, 1971); see Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d
719 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Brown v. Macy, 222 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. La. 1963), affd, 340 F.2d 115 (5th
Cir. 1965).
183. Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 377 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1964); see Carter-Wallace, Inc. v.
Gardner, 417 F.2d 1086, 1095-96 (4th Cir. 1969) (party not entitled to cross-examination if
alternative method of investigating accuracy available); Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey
Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322, 345-46 (1960).
184. Westwood, Administrative Proceedings: Techniques of Presiding, 50 A.B.A.J. 659,660
(1964). See also Recommendation No. 19, SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-62, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 51, 96-97
(1963); Cramton, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Public Utility Rate Proceedings, 51
IOWA L. REV. 267, 276-78 (1966).
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prosecution must disclose prior statements by the witness relating to
his testimony."'5 Application of this rule in agency hearings has been
riddled with controversy. 18  The Administrative Conference has
offered this sensible solution-that prior statements be made
available to the respondent at the prehearing conference. If this view is




Official notice, like its judicial notice counterpart, involves
reliance by the presiding officer-in this case, the hearing
examiner-on extra-record information. That is, the examiner in
making a decision relies upon facts and opinions not supported by
evidence "on the record." Official notice, however, is distinguishable
from judicial notice in several respects. First, a specific procedure has
been established to receive extra-record facts, with the parties
receiving notice and an opportunity to rebut the "noticed" facts.'
Second, extra-record facts usually have first been developed by the
agency's expert staff or accumulated from previous agency decisions.
But official notice is not limited to information in agency files. In
185. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The "Jeneks rule" was initially applied
to administrative agencies in NLRB v. Adhesive Prods. Corp., 258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958), and
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Cont. Bd., 254 F.2d 314 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); see SELECTED REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 1961-62, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1963).
186. For a survey of the conflict of FTC proceedings, see Papercraft Corp., 25 AD. L.2D
1063 (FTC 1969); Allied Chemical Corp., 24 AD. L.2D 112 (FTC 1969); Star Office Supply Co.,
24 AD. L.2D 472 (FTC 1968), enforced by order, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG,
REP. 19,228 (FTC 1970); Inter-State Builders, Inc., 19 AD. L.2D 7 (FTC 1966), 21 AD. L,20
1078 (FTC 1967); L.G. Balfour Co., 19 AD. L.2D 35 (FTC 1966); Viviano Macaroni Co., 19
AD. L.2D 69 (FTC 1966); E. Gellhorn, supra note 138, at 428-33. Similar difficulties experienced
by the NLRB are discussed in Alleyne, The "'Jencks Rule" in NLRB Proceedings, 9 B.C. IND.
& COMM. L. REV. 891 (1968); see NLRB v. Borden Co., 392 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1968). Finally,
for a discussion of the application of the rule by the Department of Labor, see Wirtz v,
Rosenthal, 388 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1967); Wirtz v. B.A.C. Steel Prod., Inc., 312 F.2d 14 (4th Cir.
1962); Mitchell v. Roma, 265 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1959).
187. Recommendation No. 21-Discovery in Agency Adjudication (adopted June 3, 1970);
see Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1971 DUKE L.J. 89, 149.
188. See generally FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 71-73 (1941); BENJAMIN
206-21; 1 COOPER 412-20; 2 DAVIS Ch. 15 at 383-434 (1958); W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 82-99 (1941); W. Gellhorn, Official Notice in Administrative
Adjudication, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 131 (1941); Jaffe, Administrative Procedure Re-examined: The
Benjamin Report, 56 HARV. L. REV. 704, 717-19 (1943).
189. APA § 7(d), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
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fact, it is often taken at the initiative of one of the parties. Third,
agency recognition of extra-record facts is clearly not limited to either
"indisputable" or "disputable" facts. Rather, official notice may
extend to almost any information useful in deciding the adjudication
as long as elemental fairness is observed. 90
On the other hand, in administrative adjudication, official notice
is frequently confused with the process of decision-making. In
reaching a conclusion, the examiner or agency may rely on its special
skills, whether they include particular expertise in engineering,
economics, medicine, or electricity, just as a judge may freely use his
legal skills in reading statutes and applying decided cases in the
preparation of his opinion. But such evaluations are not within the
concept of official notice. Official notice is concerned with the process
of proof, not with the evaluation of evidence. The difference between
an administrative tribunal's use of non-record information included
in its expert knowledge, as a substitute for evidence or notice, and its
application of its background in evaluating and drawing conclusions
from the evidence that is in the record, is primarily a difference of
degree rather than of kind. In principle, reliance upon the examiner's
knowledge in the process of proof is permissible only within the
confines of official notice, whereas the examiner's use of his
experience in evaluating "proof" that has been offered is not only
unavoidable but, indeed, desirable."' The troublesome problem, as
with most questions of law, is that a fine line cannot be drawn with
precision. Benjamin illustrates the point:
When the State Liquor Authority concludes, from evidence in the record as to
the size of food bills and gas bills paid (in relation to the volume of liquor
business), that the holder of a restaurant liquor license is not conducting a bona
fide restaurant, is the Authority using its experience and knowledge to evaluate
190. In contrast, judicial notice: involves no special procedure and seldom offers the parties
either notice or an opportunity to show contrary facts; usually applies to facts developed by non-
judicial sources and is often relied upon at the court's initiative; and is limited to facts not likely
to be disputed by the parties. See, e.g., C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE ch. 37 (1954); Davis, Official
Notice, 62 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1949). "The customary assumption that official notice is merely
the administrative counterpart of judicial notice . . . is fundamentally unsound. . . ." Id. At
least one observer has suggested that agencies should apply the doctrine of judicial notice to
broad, general facts of common knowledge which are of an undisputed nature, thus avoiding the
notice and rebuttal requirements of official notice, and limit official notice-with its procedural
requirements-to disputable facts. Muir, The Utilization of Both Judicial and Official Notice
by Administrative Agencies, 16 AD. L. REv. 333 (1964); see 2 DAVIS § 15.09 (Supp. 1965). The
agencies, however, have not explicitly adopted this suggestion.
191. See, e.g., ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 98 (1913); Feinstein v. N.Y.
Cent. R.R., 159 F. Supp. 460,464 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (L. Hand, J.).
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and draw conclusions from the evidence, or is it using its experience and
knowledge as a substitute for further evidence as to the normal relation of the
size of food and gas bills to the volume of food business?. . . My own view is
that . . . the procedure described is permissible [evaluation]; but until the
courts have decided specific questions of this character, it is impossible to
anticipate with any certainty what their decision would be." 2
Beyond this or other examples, little guidance can be offered.
The primary thrust behind official notice is to simplify or ease the
process of proof. Where facts are known or can be safely assumed, the
process of proving what is already known is both time consuming and
unduly formal. When facts have been proven before, further proof
becomes tiresome, redundant, and lacking in common sense. At times
even the obvious could be difficult or time-consuming to prove
without affecting the final result which was never in doubt. Moreover,
administrative agencies were often created to become repositories of
knowledge and experience. It would defeat their existence to require
adherence to traditional methods of proof when alternative and
equally fair methods are readily available. On the other hand, in
developing an alternative method it is necessary to safeguard the
elements of a fair trial preserved by the traditional forms of proof.
The Attorney General's Committee accurately summarized the need:
The parties, then, are entitled to be apprised of the data upon which the agency
is acting. They are entitled not only to refute but, what in this situation is
usually more important, to supplement, explain, and give different perspective
to the facts upon which the agency relies. In addition, upon judicial review, the
court must be informed of what facts the agency has utilized in order that the
existence of supporting evidence may be ascertained." 3
Congress sought to recognize and reconcile these concerns by a single
sentence in section 7(d) of the APA: "When an agency decision rests
on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in
the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to
show the contrary."' 94
The procedure is simple. Official notice is a means by which an
agency can avoid hearing further evidence on a material fact in the
case if it notifies the parties that unless they prove to the contrary the
agency's findings will include that particular fact and allows the
parties an opportunity to present contrary evidence. Federal Trade
192. BENJAMIN 212.
193. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, supra note 188, at 72; see Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S.
292, 303-04 (1937).
194. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (Supp. V, 1970).
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Commission cases illustrate the practice. After hearing dozens of
cases indicating that consumers preferred American to foreign-made
goods-and holding, therefore, that a failure to disclose the foreign
origin of these goods was a false and deceptive act'1 5-the
Commission advised respondents in Manco Watch Strap Co.9 that
it would not hear evidence on this issue in the future. Then, in
subsequent cases where the FTC took official notice and the
respondents could not prove that American consumers preferred
either foreign goods or that the consumers had no particular
preference, the Commission upheld orders barring sales of goods not
bearing the requisite disclosures.197 On the other hand, if respondents
could show that consumers preferred French over American
perfumes, for example, the "noticed finding" would not apply.
198
Practically, then, the primary effect of taking official notice is to
transfer the burden of proof on that material fact-usually from the
agency to the respondent. The significance of this tactic varies in
proportion to the difficulty of the proponent in establishing that fact
originally and the cost and effort of the opponent in disproving it. In
most instances where agencies have taken official notice, the former
costs have been slight since the result has seemed obvious. Where the
fact is less obvious, however, these costs could prove substantial.199
195. E.g., Oxwall Tool Co., 59 F.T.C. 1408 (1961) (hand tools); Utica Cutlery Co., 56
F.T.C. 1186 (1960) (stainless steel hardware); William Adams, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 1164 (1957)
(cutlery handles); Royal Sewing Mach. Corp., 49 F.T.C. 1351 (1953) (sewing machine parts);
Rene D. Lyon Co., 48 F.T.C. 313, 317 (1951) (watch bands); Atomic Prods., Inc., 48 F.T.C. 289
(1951) (mechanical pencils); L. Heller & Son, Inc., 47 F.T.C. 34 (1950), affd, 191 F.2d 954 (7th
Cir. 1951) (imitation pearls); The Bolta Co., 44 F.T.C. 17 (1947) (sunglass lenses); Vulcan
Lamp Works, Inc., 32 F.T.C. 7 (1940) (flashlight bulbs); American Merchandise Co., 28 F.T.C.
1465 (1939) (gloves and thumbtacks). This listing is also further testimony to the FTC's historic
concentration on trivia.
196. 60 F.T.C. 495 (1962).
197. E.g., Brite Mfg. Co., 65 F.T.C. 1067 (1964), affd, 347 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(watch bands); Savoy Watch Co., 63 F.T.C. 473 (1963) (watchcases); Baldwin Bracelet Corp.,
61 F.T.C. 1345 (1962), affd, 325 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (watch bands).
198. In its pursuit of the Grail, the FTC has in fact held that consumers prefer French
perfumes and that it therefore is deceptive not to disclose the domestic origin of perfume. See,
e.g., Harsam Distrib., Inc. 54 F.T.C. 1212 (1958), affd, 263 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1959);
Establissements Rigaud, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 1032 (1939), modified, 125 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1942);
Fioret Sales Co., 26 F.T.C. 806, affd, 100 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1938).
199. In the unusual event that the evidence is split with the moving party having the burden
of establishing that material fact by a preponderance of the evidence, official notice may be the
difference between winning and losing the case. In assessing the proper place of official notice,
one should also take into account (a) the cost of establishing a general negative-which is, in
part, the reason for assigning the burden of proof to the moving party, cf. C. MCCORMICK,
EvIDENcE 675 (1954); (b) the desirability of cross-examination; and (c) the impact of denying
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The academic controversy over official notice has centered upon
sterile attempts to categorize the types of facts which can be officially
noticed. The APA's guidance is slender; it merely sets forth the
procedure which must be followed for taking notice of "material
facts." By omission it appears to suggest that facts which are not
material can be noticed in the manner of ajudge at ajudicial trial, but
it does not tell how to determine which facts are material and can
therefore be noticed.
The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
suggested a distinction between "litigation" and "non-litigation"
facts:
If information has come to an agency's attention in the course of investigation
of the pending case, it should be adduced only by the ordinary process ...
But if the information has been developed in the usual course of business of the
agency, if it has emerged from numerous cases, if it has become part of the
factual equipment of the administrators, it seems undesirable for the agencies
to remain oblivious of their own experience [and, they should take notice of
such facts].m
Professor Davis, on the other hand, rejects the notion that significance
could be attached to the time when the factual data was collected. His
criticism of the Committee's distinction stems from his conclusion
that it would "encourage guesswork" and "discourage extra-record
research of the kind that is especially needed for creation of law or
policy. It would mean. . . [for example, that] an agency could notice
only those statutes that it has previously encountered!"zol This
criticism seems somewhat unfair since the Committee's basic point
defining reliable facts-those previously established by the agency-is
sound. Davis is right, however, when he points out that the Committee
rule is too narrow. As an alternative to the Committee rule, he offers a
different standard for deciding whether an administrator may use
extra-record facts:
When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties-who
did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent-[it] is performing
an adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called adjudicative
facts. When a court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting
legislatively; the courts have created the common law through judicial
legislation, and the facts which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment are
confrontation-all of which are intimately connected with the decision whether official notice is
appropriate.
200. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, supra note 188, at 72.
201. 2 DAVIS 363-64 n.43 (1958).
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called legislative facts. . . . Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not
concern the immediate parties.m
On this basis, he asserts that legislative facts usually need not be
brought into the record by official notice; where critical, a party
should be able to challenge them by brief and argument. He contends
that adjudicative facts, on the other hand, must be brought into the
record-unless they are indisputable-either through direct proof or
by official notice. Nothing less will meet the cardinal principles of a
fair hearing-notice and an opportunity to test and rebut opposing
evidence. Whether such adjudicative facts can be officially noticed or
must be established by direct proof depends, he says, on three
variables: how close the facts are to the center of the controversy; the
extent to which the facts are adjudicative or legislative; and the degree
to which the facts are certain. As the adjudicative facts move closer to
the basic issues of the hearing, relate to the parties, and are disputed,
the usual methods of proof must be observed; as they move in the
opposite direction, official notice is permissible.2
Professor Jaffe has entered the fray briefly to point out that, in his
opinion, Professor Davis has succumbed to the lure of labels.
[W]here the facts bear closely and crucially on the issue, and are prima facie
debatable, they should be developed in evidentiary fashion-by which is meant
simply that they should be referred to in such a manner as to enable the
opponent to offer rebuttal. Such facts will not necessarily be "adjudicative"
As Davis readily concedes, the categories he defines do not in
themselves resolve which facts can be noticed in particular cases. He is
certainly correct when he points out that the central problem is to
reconcile procedural fairness with convenience and the use of agency
knowledge. The difficulty with his analysis lies not in his categories,
which are original and helpful, but rather that many cases fall outside
his definitions. A sampling of cases illustrates this point. The
existence of the Great Depression is a "legislative" fact which an
agency can include in its findings without notice to the parties, but a
specific price trend, also a general legislative fact, cannot be used to
202. Id. § 15.03 at 353.
203. Id. § 15.10.
204. Jaffe, Administrative Procedure Re-Examined: The Benjamin Report, 56 HARV. L.
REv. 704, 719 (1943); cf. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1295-96 (1952). The Davis labels of "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts are
commonly recited by agencies and courts to justify official notice decisions. See, e.g.,
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Cont. Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 110 (1961); State v. Weinstein,
322 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. 1959).
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update the figures in the record without notice to the parties."' Since a
specific price trend can be readily verified, taking notice is
appropriate; the burden of proving any substantial error is not likely
to be significant. Similarly, the courts have upheld agencies' official
notice of scientific data, technical facts, and articles in academic
journals,2 although many courts contend that this places too great a
burden on the opponent to refute the "noticed evidence."1 7
Of greater consequence is the fact that reliance upon Davis'
categories distracts from the central question of fairness-that is, is it
fair in the particular hearing to take official notice and transfer the
burden of proof to the opposing party? Two cases involving the use of
the record of a related hearing, each of which reaches an opposite
result, are perhaps the clearest examples of this suggested "fairness of
the transfer of the burden of proof" analysis. In United States v.
Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc.,2°s the ICC held two separate hearings
on competing applications for truck service between San Francisco
and Portland. Each applicant intervened in the other hearing, but the
cases were not consolidated. In reaching its decision, the Commission
relied on evidence appearing in only one record. This procedure was
upheld because both applicants were parties to both proceedings and
both had ample opportunity to present evidence, to cross-examine
witnesses, and otherwise to protect their interests.
In the second case, Dayco Corp. v. FTC,0 9 the FTC sought to take
official notice of the distribution system and practices used by the
respondent, a manufacturer of auto replacement parts, since the
system had been the subject of a prior proceeding. That prior
205. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 US. 292 (1937); West Ohio Gas Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 68 (1935); cf. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio S.W.R.R.,
226 U.S. 14, 20 (1912).
206. E.g., Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 847 (1966); McDaniel v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1964); see 46
C.F.R. § 502.226 (1970). The CAB's rules note 43 separate reports and other resource
materials of which it automatically takes official notice in economic proceedings. 14
C.F.R. § 302.24(m) (1) (1970).
207. See. e.g., Sayers v. Gardner, 380 F.2d 940, 952-55 (6th Cir. 1967); Ross v. Gardner,
365 F.2d 554, 558-59 (6th Cir. 1966); Sosna v. Celebrezze, 234 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Cook v. Celebrezze, 217 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
208. 327 U.S. 515 (1947); see Safeway Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795, 803 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 932 (1967); cf Zimmerman v. Board of Regents, 31 App. Div.2d
560, 294 N.Y.S.2d 435 (3d Dep't 1968).
209. 362 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1966). The judicial reception of official notice is more hospitable
where the fact being noticed is of less a personal (i.e., adjudicative) nature. See, e.g.,
Dombrovskis v. Esperdy, 321 F.2d 463, 467 (2d Cir. 1963).
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proceeding, in which respondent was only a witness, was brought
against his customers. The court ruled that the FTC's attempt to take
official notice of these "adjudicative" facts from the first proceeding
was improper because the manufacturer was not a party, but only a
witness, to the prior proceeding. To allow official notice in this
circumstance, the court reasoned, would have eliminated the
Commission's entire burden of proof.The agency had asserted that its
reliance on prior knowledge merely shifted the burden of going
forward to respondent and this burden (of correcting any FTC errors
in describing respondent's distribution system) was minimal when
compared with the cost of proving these same facts again. The FTC's
argument is not persuasive. If the agency merely sought to shift the
burden of going forward, it could have introduced the prior record as
reliable hearsay evidence subject to rebuttal or as written evidence
with an offer to make the witnesses available for cross-examination. If
handled in this manner-rather than under the official notice
rubric-the fact trier would still have to determine whether the prior
record accurately portrayed respondent's distribution system. The
court may also have perceived that there was no compelling need to
approve the Commission's proposal since the FTC could (and should)
have avoided the burden of re-proof by joining the respondent as a
party in the first proceeding. Official notice, in other words, is not
properly a procedural device to avoid the requirement of section 7(c)
of the APA that the moving party has the burden of proof. If that
burden is to be placed on respondent as a condition of doing business,
it should be accomplished openly through a shift in substantive policy
rather than covertly by manipulation of procedural devices.
When the issue of official notice is viewed in this manner, the
Davis criteria and the Attorney General's distinctions are helpful, but
not dispositive.
CONCLUSION
The rules of administrative evidence and official notice probably
will continue to be buffeted by two forces seemingly pulling in
opposite directions-namely, the desire for fairness and the need for
efficiency. Current trends suggest that the command of fairness will
control where personal security or dignity is at stake and that
efficiency will weigh heavily where private economic positions
compete with public interests. On the one hand, concern for personal
rights and dignity will require that an individual claiming benefits or
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seeking to avoid serious sanctions such as revocation of parole is
entitled to a full hearing with notice before the applicant is
disadvantaged, to the right to know and confront all evidence
considered by the tribunal, and to effective assistance in preparing and
presenting his case. In addition, it seems likely that in deciding these
issues agencies increasingly will have the burden of presenting the
evidence, of demonstrating its reliability, of proving that a benefit
should be withheld, and of showing that all exculpatory information
has been disclosed. On the other hand, where the public's demand for
a safe environment is imperiled or its interest in fair dealing is
threatened, especially by private economic interests, agencies will have
to find ways to shorten administrative adjudications if formal
hearings are to continue. The near future will probably see agencies
developing summary techniques designed to acquire reliable evidence,
to make it available to all parties, to open the record for commentary
by interested parties whose testimony will not create substantial
interference with the proceedings, and to enable the rendering of final
decisions while meaningful, effective action is still possible.
The ultimate test is whether the agencies can develop fair
procedures which are efficient-and vice versa. But the tougher and
more immediate problem arises where compromises must be made.
Here the questions will continue to be: Is the determination that
fairness or efficiency must be given first priority correct? Is no better
alternative available?
50 [Vol. 197 1:1
